





















The Development Finance Centre (DEFIC)  
Graduate School of Business 
University of Cape Town 
 
 
In partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree of 








































The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University f Cape Town (UCT) in terms 






Africa still has the lowest electrification rates in the world with over 600 million people 
estimated to be living without access to electricity. What makes the challenge even greater for 
Africa is that the continent is so sparsely populated that building grid infrastructure is not viable 
in many cases. However, “pay-as-you-go” solar home systems have provided the continent with 
the opportunity to correct its electrification deficit. These innovations are not new and many of 
the costs of operating these systems have reached grid parity when one considers the Levelized 
Cost of Energy Model. However, these projects still fail to meet institutional investors’ 
bankability criteria. The aim of this study is to try and understand whether solar home systems 
provide the investor with an opportunity to make a larger risk-adjusted return versus existing 
grid-based power station projects being considered on the continent. This study uses Ghana’s 
recently built Kpone power station as a case study to complete this analysis. The study also 
seeks to assess what viability criteria is employed by a broad base of investors if they were to 
consider funding off-grid power. The study makes use of the Net Present Value model to 
compare the returns for Kpone and Zola Electric’s Infinity solar home system. The study also 
conducts inductive qualitative analysis to try and ascertain what criteria is assessed for project 
viability and then builds a conceptual framework for assessing future projects. The study found 
that Kpone provided a better risk-adjusted return to that of Zola Electric’s solar home system, 
largely because of Kpone’s project finance structure reducing the risk of the investment. Our 
findings also show that investment ticket size, company track record and management track 
record are among the most highly considered criteria for investments into off-grid companies.  
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Are solar home systems a more financially viable method of electrifying African households?
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It is by no mistake that Sub-Saharan Africa has earned itself the nickname “the dark continent”. 
A summary of key metrics quickly shows the extent to which Africa has a severely 
underdeveloped electricity grid. At the end of 2017 it was estimated that 600 million people 
were without electricity on the continent (Toman, M. 2017). Seven countries had electrification 
rates above 50% and the rest of the region had an average grid access of just 20%. The continent 
that has 14% of the world’s population had 48% of the people living without electricity. At 150 
kilowatt-hours per annum our per capita consumption of electricity is just a fraction of what it 
should be by developing market standards (Castellano et al., 2015).  
Poor access to electricity hinders Africa’s ability to develop as a continent. Power outages on 
the existing grid have the effect of disrupting business productivity. The direct costs of this 
disruption can often be seen in the cost of procuring back-up power. The average firm in Africa 
incurs an electricity outage cost of between $0.46 to $1.25 per KWH by 2012 estimates. This 
accumulates to an outage cost of $1343 to $3650 per KW (Oseni, M. 2012). To give these 
numbers context, if Nigeria would have a stable electricity supply the cost savings would allow 
Nigeria to employ an incremental 1.6 million people on the national minimum wage (Oseni, M. 
2012). Studies have gone further to show the benefits of rural electrification when off-grid 
solutions are implemented. One benefit noted was the growth of rural enterprises (The World 
Bank Group. 2016). These enterprises had a positive impact on household incomes (The 
Independent Evaluation Group (2008)). There is overwhelming consensus that electrification 
of the African continent can accelerate the objective of bringing about prosperity. The true 
challenge, however, lies in the vast sums of investment needed to address the problem.  
If one considers Africa’s potential energy mix, Africa requires more than $800 billion to 
develop its electricity generation capabilities (Castellano et al., 2015). However, if one were to 
break down this figure one begins to raise interesting questions. Firstly, $490 billion is needed 
for new generating capacity and $345 billion for transmission and distribution. Secondly, Africa 
has the potential to produce 10 terawatts of energy, and 8.8 terawatts of this can be purely 
generated from solar energy (Castellano et al., (2015)).  It is with these figures in mind that 
questions arise as to why building a grid in Africa should be the only priority when recent 
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studies show a more cost-efficient and time-efficient alternative methods of delivering energy 
to the continent. 
Developments in off-grid solar and energy storage technology have brought the cost of 
electricity from these sources close to the electricity provided by the grid (Breyer, C. and 
Gerlach, A. 2012). However, in the African context where most households either have unstable 
or no electrification, the cost of full grid defection may already be economically viable due to 
high costs of back-up power such as diesel generators (Oseni, M. 2012). Thus, breakthroughs 
in solar energy costs and energy storage costs have delivered the same convenience the grid has 
been able to. This is mainly because the technology allows one to harness the suns energy then 
store it when not in use.  
By building off-grid solar solutions we potentially avoid part of the $345 Billion cost of 
building a transmission and distribution network. Lastly, building solar capabilities has already 
been known to be a quicker route to market. The question thus becomes, why have we not 
prioritized off-grid solar and storage solutions to electrify the continent? One hypothesis this 
study has is that it might not be financially viable for an investor. Thus, the study seeks to 
understand what incremental investment returns an investor could earn if they invested in a 
venture that provided solar home system that have the ability to store energy. The study seeks 
to do this by conducting a risk-adjusted return analysis for a company that provides solar home 
system to a power station that has been recently developed. We also seek to understand the 
considerations taken by investors when they asses the bankability of an energy project. This 
study seeks to be the first of its kind by building a case for whether effort should be spent 
convincing investors to fund large electricity generating power stations or Off-grid solutions in 
Africa.  
 
Theoretical perspectives  
 
There are 4 main theories that underpin this study. The first two relate to Bankability and the 
last two studies relate to the underlying theory governing how profitability is assessed. Each of 
the studies’ principles are explained below. The studies have been organised to reflect the 
advancements in the underlying theory.  Thereafter an explanation of which underlying theory 




Theories Underlying Project Bankability 
 
The first theory is the Theory of Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment by Pindyck, 1990. 
The theory states that investments have two underlying characteristics. The first is that 
investments are irreversible given that one cannot divest once an investment has been made. 
This means that investments are highly sensitive to risk. This is because once an investment 
decision has been made an investor is fully committed to absorbing that risk. Thus, an 
investment is seen as a sunk cost. If policy goals are to stimulate investment, then stability and 
credibility will be needed to stimulate this investment to prove to a potential investor that their 
investment is safe. The second principle put forward by Pindyck is that investments can be 
delayed, giving the firm time to consider their investment closely. The above underlying 
theories explain why investors choose to strictly employ bankability criterion that at times looks 
beyond the realms of basic financial return.   
 
Mohamed and McCowan, 2001 Showed that investors rely on the NPV model to arrive at an 
answer of whether a project is bankable. Thus, if a project shows a return that beats a hurdle 
rate, that investment must be considered as viable. The study points out that the level of 
uncertainty underlying some of the assumptions made in a DCF are not accounted for. 
Possibility theory puts forward a method of evaluating a project by considering both monetary 
and non-monetary issues. It does this by accounting for the probability of monetary and non-
monetary events taking place. Thus, if the probability of obtaining a NPV that beats a pre-
determined hurdle rate is acceptably high, the project is seen as viable.  
 
This study chooses to adopt Pindyck’s perspective given its recognition of the fact that project 
bankability goes beyond just meeting a targeted financial return. This study is relevant given 
many institutional investors publish criteria that go beyond projects generating financial 
returns. By choosing to endorse a strictly returns based criteria we risk dismissing important 
salient points in project financing criteria.  
 





The Žižlavský, 2014 measure was created specifically for innovative projects. It makes use of 
the Net Present Value approach and details its pro’s and con’s, showing how the measure’s 
weaknesses can be overcome. The study recognises that new, innovative, capital-intensive 
projects are inherently very risky due to their lack of revenue generating history. Off-grid solar 
projects fit this description.  The measures it proposes to combat NPV weaknesses are three 
adjustments to NPV, of which only two are considered for purposes of this study. The first is 
the risk-adjusted NPV. Simply speaking, this measure multiplies the potential payoff (cash 
flows) from the project with a probability that payoff will be realised. It then subtracts the 






- rNPV = risk-adjusted NPV 
- NPV; CFt = cash flow in period t; 
- R0 = the present probability of successfully concluding the development process and as a result of 
this realising revenue;  
- Rt = the probability as considered in period t of successfully  taking  the  product  to  market  
maturity  (pt,8  with  t>1);   
- R0/Rt  =  the  probability  as  considered  today, of generating  the  cash  flows  arising  in  period  
t,  
- r = discount factor;  
- n = the last period for which costs and revenues are accurately planned;  
- g = growth rate. 
 
The Stochastic NPV considers each cash flow as a random variable that has a  given  distribution  
of  probability  (usually  a  normal  distribution), mean value and a variance. The NPV thus 











- E(NPV) = expected NPV;  
-  E(NCFt) = the expected value of the net cash flow in each year t; 
-  rf = the risk-free rate. 
 
The last theoretical perspective is that of the Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) metric. Given 
most power plants are subject to tightly regulated selling prices, this measure looks at the cost 
of producing a single KWH over a plant’s lifetime to determine the potential profitability. This 
is obtained by comparing the newly obtained cost (LCOE) to the price per kWh hour sold to 
customers. Thus, the margin is determined by the selling price less the LCOE. Aldersey-
Williams and Rubert, 2019 found in their theoretical review that the LCOE was the preferred 
metric due to its widespread adoption. However, the measure was shown to be weak in how it 
adjusts for changes in the discount rate, inflationary effects on costs and how sensitive it was 
to changes in future commodity prices.  
 
For the purposes of this study we will be looking at using an NPV model as per Žižlavský study. 
We, however, choose to exclude the probability portion of the model given the complexities in 
establishing probabilities. The reason for choosing this metric is a recent survey run by PWC 
where it showed that this was the most common form of analysis among the top surveyed 
















To further explore the viability of implementing standalone off-grid solar solutions, a wide 
body of research was explored. The review of the literature has been structured in such a way 
to reflect the area of research and the advancements in theory over time. The first literature 
review relates to studies that compare which energy generating technology is better.  
Return on investment comparisons   
 
Szabo et al commissioned a study in early 2011 to find out what the most cost-effective 
electrification methods are for rural households in Africa. These options were diesel generators, 
photovoltaic systems (PV or off-grid solar solutions) or an extension of the existing grid. They 
sought to understand which energy source was the most cost-effective. Using spatial mapping 
to understand potential electricity output and the LCOE model they were able to calculate the 
affordability of implementing off-grid solutions. They found that sparsely populated regions 
were better served by PV and diesel generators given that grid connections are only viable when 
many consumers can be connected. However, in densely populated areas grid connections 
delivered a better cost (Szabó, Bódis, Huld and Moner-Girona, 2011). The Szabo et al study is 
like this study in the sense that it seeks to compare what the optimal technology is. However, 
the measures used differ in what they are trying to compare. The Levelized Cost of Electricity 
(LCOE) model used seeks to understand what technology offers the optimal cost over the 
technology’s lifespan. This Study, however, seeks to understand what technology offers the 
better risk-adjusted return for the same capital outlay and what would entice that investor to 
invest in off-grid solutions.  
 A study by Breyer et al seeks to understand the viability of implementing PV solutions in 305 
markets. Viability in this study was defined as whether the cost of PV is the same as the grid 
(also known as grid parity). The method they implemented was the LCOE model. The study 
found that off-grid PV solutions were already viable in African markets that did not have a grid 
(Breyer, C. and Gerlach, A. 2012).  Ondraczek et al ran a similar study to that of Breyer in that 
they mapped per country the LCOE. However, their study sought to understand where PV and 
storage reached parity with grid costs, but also based on the LCOE model, which markets 
offered the best cost for benefit (benefit being defined as electricity output). Their findings 
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suggested that countries in the northern hemisphere offered the best cost benefit only because 
of the low cost of capital. However, if one were to strip these costs out, African countries offered 
the better cost benefit due to the amount of sun available on the continent (Ondraczek, 
Komendantova and Patt, 2013). The above studies partially answer the questions this study 
seeks to answer in that they show that off-grid is competitive versus other technologies.  They 
do not tell us, however, which technology should be prioritised by investors based on a risk-
adjusted return criteria. This study seeks to understand what technology offers the better risk-
adjusted return for the same capital outlay and what would entice that investor to invest in off-
grid solutions. 
A study by Siddiqui in 2015 used the LCOE method to understand when micro grid parity 
would be reached in Germany, Pakistan and South Africa. The significance of this study is 
that it looked at the viability of micro grids and not only standalone off-grid solar energy and 
storage solutions. The study found that in Pakistan, where the grid connection is very low, 
implementing multiple micro grids was already viable from a consumer cost perspective. The 
study concluded that for South Africa, these parities would only be reached in 2040-2050 
(Siddiqui, 2015). It also fails to explain whether this viability results in a significant 
incremental return for investors.  
  
This study seeks to further the research by exploring whether standalone off-grid solutions 
also offer superior returns over and above being viable using a NPV model as opposed to the 
LCOE.  
 
Yujia Tao and Finenko, 2016 investigated why renewable energy sources which had reached 
grid parity did not result in investors investing in these renewable energy projects. They 
explained this phenomenon in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The paper’s objective 
was to show that assessing viability by only assessing the LCOE was an incomplete benchmark 
in energy mix decision making. They used the NPV model  to assess the viability of projects 
across various SID nations. The study showed that financing conditions, such as the split of 
debt and equity, had a strong influence on economic feasibility of solar projects. The second 
consideration was that the LCOE in the assessment of profitability was misleading due to its 
inaccurate accounting for revenue and financing considerations. Yujia and Finenko’s paper is 
useful in showing us the flaws of LCOE in investment assessments. This paper intends to add 
to the body of literature by using the NPV model in its assessment for African off-grid projects 
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and power station projects with the intention of establishing whether an investor stands to make 
more by investing in SHS companies.  
 
Baurzhan and Jenkins, 2016 wrote a paper with the objective of understating the feasibility of 
off-grid solar PV systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. The paper looked at understanding five 
elements of feasibility. These were cost-effectiveness, affordability, financing, environmental 
impact, and poverty alleviation. With regards to cost-effectiveness and financing, the paper 
used the LCOE model to understand these metrics. They compared SHS to diesel generators. 
The paper finds that cost-effectiveness will only be reached in 8-16 years. The cost hurdle 
means firms will be expected to subsidize the electricity provided by these units into the 
foreseeable future for households to afford this form of electricity. It also sees the lack of 
financial history as a burden to allowing for the pay-as-you-go financing model. The paper 
judges feasibility based on the cost of electricity and not based on whether an investor stands 
to gain more in terms of return. Our study seeks to look at potential returns of off-grid solar to 
other technologies using a DCF model as opposed to comparing just costs.  
 
The objective of a study by Yang and Yang, 2017 was to establish whether off-grid solar 
solutions were viable versus existing energy sources. The significance of the study is that they 
looked at energy sources used primarily in rural Africa. They used the LCOE model to try and 
understand the cost of kerosene and candle lamps, pay-as-you-go off-grid solutions and diesel 
power in Africa. “Pay-as-you-go” solutions, which are effectively SHS, offered the best cost 
per kWh and kerosene the worst. While the study helps us understand the viability of off-grid 
solar solutions in rural settings, it does not show whether SHS offers a better risk-adjusted 
return for investors versus existing energy sources. This paper intends to add to the body of 
literature by using the discounted cash flows model (NPV analysis) in its assessment for 
African off-grid projects and power station projects with the intention of establishing whether 
an investor stands to make more by investing in SHS companies.  
 
In Atal and Shrimali’s 2018 study they sought to understand 1) whether renewable energy or 
fossil fuels offered better returns 2) investors’ risk perception of the two technologies and 3) 
what the factors were that contributed to the differing risk perceptions in India. They 
conducted their study by using empirical analysis of financial performance of power 
producing companies. They also conducted primary research with investors. They found that 
the renewable power sector was less risky than the fossil fuel sector when one considered 
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systematic risk. They also find that the renewable power sector offered 12% higher annual 
returns 20% lower annual volatility, and 61% higher risk-adjusted returns.  The methodology, 
however, is limiting given they only considered listed companies on the Indian stock 
exchange. The study answered the questions the study seeks to answer. However, the studies 
are only applicable to India and listed established companies. Our paper intends to add to the 
literature by using a discounted cash flows model to ascertain whether off-grid investments 
result in incremental return. 
 
Nissen and Harfst, 2019 recently reviewed the LCOE model for evaluating renewable 
technologies. The objective of their study was to show how the model was an inappropriate 
model for making investment decisions on whether investments should be placed into 
renewable technologies. The reason they gave was that it neglected energy price changes over 
time. The study shows that the LCOE does not consider full price changes in electricity and 
thus does not account for the full NPV value a project can potentially deliver. This finding 
was consistent with the findings by Yujia Tao and Finenko, 2016. They proposed a new 
formula to consider the changes in energy prices and operating expenses over time. The 
formula was derived from the NPV formula. The study, although not related to understanding 
which energy producing technology provides the best return, does show us that a NPV 
approach is warranted in our analysis. This study will seek to further Atal and Shrimali’s 
research by comparing the risk-adjusted returns for traditional power stations versus 






To date there is not a clear set of criteria that off-grid companies are required to meet before 
they can acquire the necessary funding needed to scale their projects. The literature and 
published information on the requirements needed to meet project viability is often unclear due 
to the lack of specific detail needed to meet bankability criteria. There is also no framework or 
established criteria that can be referred to when assessing what needs to be in place in order to 
have a bankable project. There is, however, a large body of interviews, reports and assessments 
that have been conducted to establish what is required to unlock institutional investment. The 




Bankability literature review 
 
An earlier report released by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2012 looked at 
what the main barriers to off-grid project bankability were. The report identified that 
commercial banks’ primary assessments constitute the transaction costs, cost of lending and 
risk return profiles. The report found that this drove commercial banks to reject projects that 
require small scale financing because they lacked the scale needed to cover the transaction 
costs (IFC, 2012). The alternative is project finance, but this requires large deal sizes to make 
the transaction costs associated with the project viable. Another barrier identified was the lack 
of track record by the management of off-grid companies and the company’s profit history 
(IFC, 2012). This study is useful in that it highlights the criteria current off-grid projects fail 
to meet. The study, however, is only specific to one type of investor and only looks at a few 
issues with bankability. This study seeks to further the bounds of knowledge by consolidating 
all requirements into an easy-to-use bankability framework applicable to the largest investors 
across various investor types.  
 
 
A Bhattacharyya, 2012 study investigated the barriers to further funding of energy access with 
a focus on off-grid projects. The study found that in all successful funding cases the state played 
a significant role in funding and providing policy certainty to the project. This study shows that 
the state is a significant influence on projects becoming financially viable. It adds to the 
literature by showing that regulatory certainty should form part of off-grid bankability criteria. 
The study, however, does not provide an exhaustive list of the criteria investors evaluate when 
assessing project viability. This paper aims to contribute to the literature by adding a bankability 
framework that includes an exhaustive list of criteria that large institutional investors could use 
to assess off-grid energy projects. The framework also seeks to clarify the specific government 
support sought by investors. 
 
 
In an earlier report released by AT Kearney and GOGLA, 2014 investors and off-grid energy 
companies were interviewed. A series of questions were asked to try and ascertain what the 
barriers were to investing in off-grid companies. Some of the key findings were that small 
deal size, a lack of successful investments in the industry and better opportunities elsewhere 
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were found to be significant barriers. The report findings are consistent with an earlier report 
released by IFC, 2012. The report, however, lacked detail on what exactly the investors were 
looking for under each mentioned criterion. There also is no clear understanding of who the 
assessed investors were and how much capital they had available to dispense. The study by 
AT Kearney and GOGLA is useful in that it provided a general overview of what the key 
criteria to investing were. It did not provide an absolute indication of what, for example, the 
consensus of what the deal size should be.  
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by adding a bankability framework that includes 
an exhaustive list of criteria large institutional investors should use to assess off-grid energy 
projects. The framework also seeks to clarify the specific government support investors are 
looking for.  
 
In a survey conducted by PWC in 2015 one of the questions utility directors across Africa 
were asked was what the barriers were to further investment in the sector. The common 
concerns were cost reflective electricity tariffs that cover the cost of production and allow the 
investor to make a return. The second was the inability to obtain finance due to high 
perceived risks. Thirdly, regulatory uncertainty and government planning on grid extension 
plans were cited. Lastly, offtaker risks and the ability of the offtaker to pay for power were 
the last common concerns (PWC, 2015). The PWC report was much more specific than the 
report released by AT Kearney and Googla in outlining what was needed to make energy 
projects viable. The report, however, related to traditional base load power stations as 
opposed to off-grid energy companies. The report, however, is useful in that it provides 
clarity on what regulatory certainty investors are looking for. This study seeks to rank the 
importance of each key criteria that institutional investors look at and provide detail of the 
specific amount or specifics assed in project bankability. Further to this, the study then seeks 
to use a newly developed framework to assess bankability criterion. 
 
A Niraula, 2015 study looked at how standardizing the design of a microgrid could deliver the 
lowest cost of production of a PV solution. The PV solution would deliver the highest output 
of electricity and lowest cost of electricity. This was a key barrier to unlocking institutional 
investment. The study not only finds that standardizing the design helps to reduce this cost, 
but also if projects were to be aggregated, it would help achieve scale. The study went further 
to show that microgrids were viable in geographically dense regions when scaled. The study 
by Anjal is like this study in that it looked at addressing one aspect of project bankability 
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which was the issue of scale. The study, however, did not go as far as to explain what all the 
barriers to bankability were, nor did it explain at what level a project can be deemed to be 
“scaled”. The study is also limiting in that it only looks at micro grids and not SHS solutions. 
This paper seeks to add to the literature by taking the consistencies of what is needed to make 
off-grid projects viable and put them into a framework that is easy to use and provides a 
detailed understanding of project viability.  
 
In Mckinsey’s “A Brighter Africa” report the company looked at the key elements needed to 
make energy investment a reality on the continent. The report focused on the criteria needed to 
make traditional base load power stations bankable and not necessarily off-grid applications. 
The report concludes that there needs to be financial viability by government guaranteeing cost 
reflective tariffs and ensuring there is an off-taker agreement in place. Currently the challenges 
faced are a lot of utilities are selling electricity at below cost, there aren’t significant off takers 
and there are challenges collecting money. These findings are consistent in the findings of the 
PWC report released in 2015. The second was to create an environment were other sources of 
financing can be utilised such as private-public partnerships and encouraging Independent 
Power Producers. Lastly, there needs to be the provision of clear and transparent regulation and 
the building of structures to allocate risks to the party best suited to absorb them via project 
finance structures. The report also called for the provision of credible off takers and risk 
guarantees provided by governments (Castellano et al., 2015). The report by Mckinsey provides 
further clarity to the 2015 PWC report on what regulatory certainty and support is needed. It 
also provides clarity on what risks are of concern which are namely tariff risks and off taker 
risks. The report however is very specific to traditional Utilities and not off-grid energy 
companies. Our study seeks to clarify these risks for off-grid companies. It also seeks to make 
this criterion clear in an easy to use framework. 
 
A study by Shi et al in 2016 looked to understand the effect supporting instruments had on 
encouraging investment into off-grid solar projects in developing markets. Supporting 
instruments were classified as financial incentives (grants and loan guarantees), fiscal 
incentives (import duty and VAT exemptions) and elimination of market distortions (such as 
fossil fuel subsides). They planned to assess the effect these supporting instruments had by 
building an assessment framework. The framework used was a three-dimensional framework 
that assessed feasibility, sustainability and reproducibility. A survey was then run to understand 
which of the three dimensions were most important. The survey results suggest that feasibility, 
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sustainability is more important than reproducibility. The instruments that drove feasibility and 
sustainability were local engagement, loan guarantees and start-up grants. (Shi, Liu and Yao, 
2016). These metrics add to our study by showing us the key instruments that aide in helping 
off-grid projects achieve bankability. They do not, however, show us what criterion is assessed 
by institutional investors. This study fills this gap by providing both a framework and 
exhaustive list of criterions for assessing bankability   
 
The Economist set out to conduct expert interviews, desk research and conducted field work to 
understand the barriers to further renewable investment in Sub Saharan Africa. The Economist 
concluded that there was a lack of appropriately priced off-grid solutions for African 
consumers, that a significant amount of governments fail to institute cost reflective tariffs, there 
is a lack of regulatory certainty and planning from central governments on where the existing 
grid is likely to extend to (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016). The report also notes off 
taker risks as a key concern for further investment. The Economist report is consistent with the 
PWC and Mckinsey reports. It, however, valuable in the sense that it was specific to off-grid 
applications and not just base load power stations. The report also highlights a new risk in that 
the off-taker risk in off-grid applications is the final consumer. Our study seeks to add to this 
body of literature by developing an exhaustive list of bankability criteria and establishing an 
easy to use framework to assess these criteria. 
 
An off-grid Market trends report developed by the world bank group, 2016 looked at the 
challenges off-grid electricity companies faced when raising finance. The report segments the 
companies based on the stage in their company’s lifecycle. It concludes that SHS companies 
lack the track record of both their business model and management’s.  These were seen as key 
drivers in a company’s ability to raise capital due to its perceived risk. The report also placed a 
specific amount on what was a saleable project. This number was placed at $50-100 million for 
an individual firm. The report looks at using special purpose vehicles that are common to 
project finance capital structures to manage the debt levels needed for off-grid projects to reach 
scale. This is both to manage the debt risk and the business risk. It also proposes consumer debt 
become securitized so that it can trade on secondary markets in order to reduce the interest rate 
because of the attraction of more investors (The World Bank Group, 2016). The report is useful 
in that it clearly outlines the various stages of off-grid companies and what funding is needed 
in order for it to scale. In addition to highlighting the challenges to reaching bankability, it 
proposes solutions needed to aiding scalability to make off-grid projects more investor 
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attractive. This study seeks to expand on this report by adding additional clarity to what 
bankability criteria is needed and providing this information in a easy to use framework. 
 
A 2016 report commissioned by the Bertha Centre looked to understand what the further 
barriers were to scaling off-grid energy. One the barriers highlighted to extending the services 
were consumer affordability of the innovation, awareness of the benefits of the product and 
driving depth of distribution of the product. Additional barriers sighted to scaling projects were 
the relatively small deal sizes, limited track record of both the business model and entrepreneurs 
and policy uncertainty. The report goes further to agree with the Bloomberg report 
commissioned by the world bank that the life stages of many of these companies deem them 
inadequate for them to receive additional finance. Thus investors are looking for scale to make 
these projects project financeable. The Bertha centre suggests a framework that taps into the 
existing pool of funds. It does this by bucketing the existing funds into two pools. The first a 
fund to finance working capital and the second to finance innovation and the infrastructure 
needed to drive distribution and scale. The funds are said to address the current issues faced by 
off-grid companies. (Bertha Center for social innovation and entrepreneurship, 2016). The 
bertha centre’s study supports the view of the world bank group, 2016 on what the key barriers 
to bankability are. It adds to the body of knowledge by proposing a framework that buckets 
money into two funds. The first fund is to finance working capital and the second to finance 
innovation and the infrastructure needed to drive distribution and scale. Our study adds to the 
above study by proposing a framework that helps bring clarity to what bankability criteria is.  
 
Malhotra et al were seeking to understand what would drive the bankability of off-grid 
electrification projects in India. Their initial hypothesis was that projects needed to be 
aggregated and de-risked to achieve the investment volumes required to make a difference. By 
assessing investment risks, conducting qualitative analysis on investment risks and a 
quantitative analysis of the effects of assessed risks on the cost of capital, they were able to 
show that aggregating off-grid solar projects had a significant effect on de-risking these 
investments (Malhotra et al., 2017). The study deals with an aspect of the barriers to making 
off-grid projects project financeable which is scale. The study is also useful in showing that 
scale leads to a lower risk profile which in turn increases the likelihood of a project being 
bankable due to the improved adjusted risk return profile.  The study, however, was specific to 
India and does not answer what the criteria to investing would be for Africa. Our study seeks 
to understand the same scalability criteria, however, specific to African off-grid projects. It also 
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seeks to create an exhaustive list of bankability criteria and a framework for assessing project 
viability.  
 
Yang and Yang, 2017 also looked at the key barriers identified for further growth of the off-
grid sector in Africa. They assessed the high cost of electrification in East Africa, low 
affordability and lack of financial resource mainly due to the poor returns on offer. The study 
provided ways of making the off-grid sector more bankable. These were increasing scale to 
reduce costs (both the investment per unit and transaction costs), de-risking investments thus 
reducing the cost of capital and providing government support in the form of innovative 
legislation. The study is consistent with the findings in Malhotra study in that scale and de-
risking investments increase the chances of achieving viability. The study is also helpful in so 
far as showing how scale and reduced risk effect African off-grid projects. The study, however, 
doesn’t provide an exhaustive list or a framework for us to understand the criteria needed to 
make a project viable for institutional funding. This study seeks to further the body of 
knowledge by creating a framework in which all off-grid projects can be assessed for project 
viability.  
 
Poitrimolt, 2017, through interviews and industry reports found four key barriers to large scale 
deployment of off-grid solutions. The dissertation highlights regulatory uncertainty as the first 
given grid extension is far cheaper for a consumer than off-grid applications. Without 
knowledge of where the grid will be extended to poses a risk. The literature also points towards 
a balance between being too far away from urban areas where spending power is greater and 
too close where grid encroachment becomes a factor. The second barrier identified was business 
model validation and making sure the business model works. The study identifies the same 
challenges studies by the bertha centre and off-grid trends identified. These challenges are, off-
grid companies find themselves in a financing stage where the amount they need to validate 
their business models are too high for impact investors and too low and risky for institutional 
investors. The study finds that the model validation phase struggles to achieve financing due to 
the small deal size. This is important given there are transaction costs associated with due 
diligence. These costs are fixed and often make the amount of financing required too small to 
recoup these costs. To combat this scale is needed to share those costs over a larger project. 
There is also a mismatch in investment horizons where off-grid companies seek 7-12 year 
periods while most investors are not willing to provide such a long horizon. Another barrier is 
the required rates of returns for risky projects. Given the consumer being serviced, there are 
20 
 
worries returns will be too low. The study by Poitrimolt adds to the current bounds of 
knowledge by showing where the financing gaps exist, the misalignment in investment horizons 
and the significant business model risks. The study also identifies $10 million as the critical 
threshold for where a project has enough scale to attract investment. Our study seeks to bring 
clarity of the bankability criteria by establishing a consensus on all the bankability criteria that 
needs to be met to achieve project viability.  
 
A recently published article released by IEEE Spectrum interviewed Daniel Bekker, Managing 
Director of E-ON off-grid solutions, and executives at Rafiki off-grid solutions. They cited that 
a barrier to gaining financing was reaching at least 10 000 electricity connections. Rafiki Off-
grid solutions went further to state that 200 000 – 300 000 is when one could expect an off-grid 
project to reach the scale needed to realise cost savings (Fairley, P. 2017). One could assume 
that this is the same level a project meets the “scale criteria” needed to achieve project 
bankability. The above interviews help aide this study by giving clarity on one of the 
bankability criterions which is scale. The interviews are, however, not a complete set of 
bankability criteria. This study hopes to contribute to the literature by creating this complete 
criterion together with a framework for assessing project viability.  
 
 
A report released by the international Finance Corporation provided an overview of the risk 
appetite, type of investee, deal size, return profile and conditions of Financing for off-grid 
projects globally. The findings detailed what each investor types preferences were for the 
above-mentioned categories (The International Finance Corporation, 2018). For off-grid 
projects to grow to levels seen by utilities they require commercial debt and financing from 
institutional investors. The report found that the average ticket size by investors typically 
ranged between $5-10 million. Commercial debt was seen to have a low risk appetite while 
commercial equity exhibited medium to high risk appetites. The report findings are useful in 
that they show what the average deal size was and the relative risk appetite. The issue with the 
report findings is that 1) it is global specific and not Africa specific and 2) it relies on past data 
on the investors who have been brave enough to invest into this industry. Our study seeks to 
understand both historical trends and what needs to be in place to unlock future funding. This 
will be achieved by get clear guidelines on what bankability criteria is needed and a framework 




A report by the UNDP and ETH Zurich sought to understand how best to de-risk off-grid solar 
projects. The study focused on solar mini grids as opposed to complete standalone off-grid 
solutions. Given the high capital outlay needed for solar mini grids in often what are deemed 
to be high risk environments, these projects viabilities are often penalised by the high cost of 
capital needed that comes with equity investments (ETH Zurich and UNDP, 2018). This is 
mainly because no lender is willing to give debt to finance these projects. The report draws on 
other reports to look at what the most effective method of de-risking projects. These are 
summarized as policy certainty, transferring risk to those best suited to deal with the risk via 
project finance structures, reward excess risk with either subsidies or tax breaks and diversify 
risk via scaling up these projects. The methodology used by the study was to identify the risk 
environment by conducting interviews with the private sector and quantifying the impact of the 
risk, identifying public de-risking instruments to mitigate identified risks and quantifying the 
impact the de-risking instrument has on reducing finance costs. The impact on the reduced cost 
of finance is then calculated using the LCOE (ETH Zurich and UNDP, 2018). The study is 
useful in that it establishes a methodology with which to understand risk. It is also useful in 
showing what the identified barriers to bankability were and how best to deal with them. The 
study conducted by the report, however, addresses risk and not what criteria is looked at to 
assess bankability on the continent. The study we are conducting aims to find all factors 
effecting the risk of projects and putting them into a framework to assess bankability thus 
adding to the body of knowledge.  
 
 
Bilotta and Colantoni, 2018 looked at the key barriers to financing energy on the continent. 
What they found was that two of the biggest obstacles to energy bankability on the continent 
were the high-risk premiums placed on African infrastructure projects which in turn leads to a 
higher requested rate of return. However, to date models deem a lot of African energy projects 
unviable due to low return. The paper suggests that to combat this barrier firms need to reduce 
risk premiums by reducing risk. One way of doing this is by route of aggregation and another 
is by reducing the uncertainty of payment by implementing Pay-as-you-go payment methods 
and a pricing structure affordable to African consumers (Bilotta and Colantoni, 2018). The 
study shares the same findings as the UNDP report of 2018, Poitrimolt study of 2017 and 
Malhotra’s 2017. It doesn’t, however, provide a detailed overview of what are the key drivers 
of off-grid project bankability in Africa. This study aims to provide an exhaustive detailed list 
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of what bankability entails for off-grid projects in Africa. We also propose a new framework to 
achieve this bankability.  
 
The International Renewable Energy Agency released a report that investigated the key factors 
needed to create an enabling environment for off-grid investments. Some of the key issues 
highlighted were policy and regulatory certainty, the establishment of institutional frameworks 
to implement off-grid electrification strategies (International Renewable Energy Agency, 
2018). This report has the same findings of earlier reports that policy certainty and a strong 
regulatory environment are key enabling factors for further investment in off-grid energy. The 
paper adds to the literature on this body of literature by calling for the establishment of 
institutional frameworks that encourage investment into off-grid energy. The paper however, 
only deals with policy and regulation and doesn’t give a clear framework or exhaustive list of 
what is needed to enable a viable project. 
 
In the Alliance for Rural Electrification’s 2018 report, 15 companies across 10 countries that 
either directly offered off-grid technology solutions or offered support products for energy 
access were asked what the key barrier to achieving their objectives were. This was done by 
having each company send in their profiles to the organisation. What was found is that 
companies mainly cited three reasons for failing to scale their objectives. The first was the ticket 
size of the investments didn’t justify the associated transaction costs. Thus, the projects lacked 
scale. The second issue raised was the misaligned investment time horizons of both debt and 
equity. Lastly, the policy and regulatory environment with regards to off-grid energy is vague 
or often non-existent. In addition to this, where there are support government institutions, the 
institutions in place often lack capacity and a clear strategy. This study adds to the body of 
literature by providing an investee view of what the barriers each investee has faced in attracting 
further investment. Our study adds to the literature by combining the views of both investors 
and investees to provide a clear bankability framework 
 
Literature review conclusion 
 
The existing body of literature has done well to show that standalone off-grid is already a 
cost-effective energy solution for Africa in the long run. The existing body of literature has 
done well to highlight the key issues in achieving bankability. However, there remains a gap 
in knowledge on whether standalone Off-grid solutions provide superior returns for an 
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investor and not just a superior consumer cost structure. The importance of answering this is, 
financial resources are finite and investors need assurances that they finite resource will 
deliver the best financial outcome for them. The best way to show them that this is possible is 
to show them that SHS provide an opportunity to maximise their risk-adjusted return. To the 
best of our knowledge this question has yet to be answered. Secondly, the common criteria 
used to assess project bankability differs from investor to investor and there is no real 
consolidated framework to understand project bankability criterion. It is also unclear what the 
general criteria is for all institutional investors to invest in off-grid solar projects. This study 
seeks to bridge the current gap in knowledge by creating an easy to use framework that 
assesses project bankability based on the findings of the existing literature. Our study adds to 






To achieve the objectives set out in this study, the study intends: 
- To use the DCF model to arrive at an NPV, to Compare the risk-adjusted returns of a 
natural gas power station (Kpone) to Zola Electric’s infinity SHS unit.  




The questions this study seeks to answer is: 
- What incremental investment returns can be earned if investors were to invest in off-
grid solar storage solutions versus existing technologies? 
- What are the key considerations to making off-grid solar solutions bankable?  
Research Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis set out in this paper are: 
- SHS provides investors with a better return. 
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The research will: 
 
- Only focus on Ghana and will not seek to answer the question for all African countries.  
- Compare SHS to one power generating technology, namely, a natural gas power station.  
 
Data and Methodology  
 
The study aims to understand which method of energy production makes the most commercial 
sense to electrify the African continent. In this section we elaborate on which research 
methodology will be used to answer the research question. This is done by explaining the 
research design, data collection methods, unit of analysis and the analytical techniques to be 
used.  
Return on investment comparisons   
Research design 
This is a quantitative study that made use of the document review method for quantitative 
research to collect secondary data. The documents reviewed in this study came from public 
records with the most notable being the GOOGLA, The International Renewable Energy 
Agency, GOG, Cenpower, The World Bank and The Ghanaian Reserve Bank.  The study then 
employed the DCF method to derive a NPV whose results were  subsequently used in a 
Equivalent Annual Annuity formula to compare projects with different lifespans. The aim of 
this data collection method and analytical technique is to use hard evidence and existing data 
to draw accurate conclusions to how investment returns would behave when comparing the two 
methods of electrification using an already established method of assessing these returns.. The 
study seeks to understand, based on existing data of energy costs and energy production 
potential, what incremental value can be derived from SHS solutions. This incremental value 
is a calculation based on existing data and the value we seek to determine cannot be established 
by qualitative means. The above method is appropriate given it draws on data that is public and 
makes use of a method that is widely used and established. 
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Data collection Methods 
The data collection method will be to use the document review method with a particular focus 
on documents that are public record. All sources  will be  secondary data drawn from from 
various existing studies and published data held by industry experts, think tanks and the existing 
bodies of published works. The databases identified for this study came from GOOGLA, The 
International Renewable Energy Agency, GOG, Cenpower, The World Bank and The Ghanaian 
Reserve Bank. Where data cannot be found reasonable assumptions will be made in their place. 
Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis will be the NPV . Studies have identified Africa’s potential generating 
capacity to come from Coal, Natural Gas Geothermal Energy and Hydro-electric energy 
(Castellano et al., 2015). For purposes of this, Ghana natural gas power station, Kpone, will be 
compared to Zola Electric Ghana.  
Analytical technique  
The key reason for choosing familiar metrics is that the point of the exercise is to “communicate 
in a language” used by all industry experts today. The metrics chosen have been widely adopted 
by industry. In a 2016/2017 PWC survey it was shown that the most widely preferred analytical 
techniques for infrastructure investments was the Net Present Value calculation (PWC, (2017)).  
- Net Present Value (NPV) 
A review of why the measure was chosen, what the limitations are of the measure, a breakdown 
of each key variable in the measure and a model to test the validity of the model are proposed 
below.  
NPV 
The NPV is calculated by subtracting the initial cost of investment from the discounted cash 
flows (DCF). This measure essentially helps us understand if an investment delivers more cash 
flows than what we initially paid for the investment. The measure is very sensitive to 
assumptions of potential cash flows and the discount rate. The smallest change to the 
assumptions can alter the results. The valuation is also very sensitive to changes in company 
expectations. The smallest changes in expected return, capital expenditure etc. can cause a 
change in the fair value calculation. The variable definitions can be seen below. These are:  
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FCF: these are the calculated cash flows that take both cash inflows such as revenue and 
outflows such as capital expenditure into account.  





Research design  
A quantitative approach will be used to conduct the first research question of understanding 
what unit delivers the highest risk-adjusted return. The steps can be described as below: 
 
Step 1:  
The aim of this step is to understand what is currently being considered as a solution to closing 
the energy generation deficit on the continent. For purposes of this study Ghana’s independent 
Power producer (IPP) built power station, Kpone, was chosen. Kpone is a model of how future 
project finance structures could take shape on the continent, hence why this study has chosen 
it as an example. The project is also situated in a region where Zola Electric, the off-grid 
company we seek to compare Kpone to, operates as well. This makes the comparison in 
generating potential optimal.  
Step 2:  
This step involves understanding how many households are expected to be connected by each 
PowerStation project being considered. This helps understand the overall expected impact the 
PowerStation will have on electrifying the continent  
Step 3:  
27 
 
One needs to then find the number of Off-grid units needed to match the proposed power station 
electrification capacity. This helps us to hold the electricity generating capacity component of 
the study constant. 
Step 4:  
The capital outlay of each project needs to be established to get a sense of project value size for 
both the off-grid project and the traditional PowerStation  
Step 5: 
The timeframe an investor is expected to be part of the project needs to be established with the 
overall assumption being that an investor would participate equally as long in a PowerStation 
then they would in an off-grid project. This is to ensure that the effects of time impact our 
expected returns equally. 
Step 6:  
Establishing the investment risks will be done based on assessing what a survey of investors 
feels the risk of an investment are and what return they expect in return for this risk. This data 
will be ascertained by looking at the PWC 2017 survey of investment industry experts 
Step 7:  
Establish the weight of debt and equity in the overall financing structure for the two comparable 
projects. The weight of debt and equity will be based on historical weights for past projects 
Step 8:  
Understand the cost of debt and equity in the financing structure using data where applicable 
to ascertain facts such as the expected interest rates, historical market returns and market betas. 
Step 9:  
The revenue assumption of the project should be based on the current cost of electricity and the 
willingness to pay of the final consumer for each context to be considered.  
Step 10: 
The cost of operations for each project then needs to be established. The current expected costs 
can be drawn by making accurate assumptions based on past data for comparable power stations 
or based on industry reports prepared by experts. 
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Step 11:  
Understand the amount of electricity to be consumed by each consumer by considering the 
current consumption rates and likely future consumption rates in each context.  
Step 12:  
Understand the effects of taxation, risk insurance and changes in working capital on the effects 
of the model. 
Step 13: 
Calculate the weighted average cost of capital in each year of the project based on the cost of 
debt and equity and weight of debt and equity established in steps 7 and 8. 
Step 14:  
Calculate the Net Present Value of each project under consideration. 
Step 15:  
Given we are working with projects of unequal length the Equivalent Annual Annuity will be 
used to make a fair comparison of the projects NPV’s. The formula to be employed is: 
C = (r x NPV) / (1 - (1 + r)-n ) 
Where: 
C= Equivalent Annual Annuity  
NPV= Net Present Value  
R= interest rate per period  
N= Number of periods  
Step 16:  
Analyse and interpret the results making sure to understand the quantitative and qualitative 






Below is a step by step process detailing the framework to be used 























Step 1:  
Understand the key 
differences between 
Kpone and Zola Electric 
 
Step 2:  
Understand how many 
households are expected to 
be connected with a power 
station 
Step 3:  
Ascertain the number of 
Off-grid units needed to 
match the proposed power 
station  
 
Step 4:  
Ascertain the capital 
outlay of each project 
 
Step 5: 
Establish timeframe an 
investor is expected to be 
part of the project. 
 
Step 6:  
Establishing the 
investment risks and 
required return needed 
 
Step 7:  
Establish the weight of 
debt and equity in the 
overall financing structure  
 
Step 8:  
Understand the cost of debt 
and equity in the financing 
structure  
 
Step 9:  
The revenue assumption 
of the project should be 
based on the current cost 
of electricity  
Step 10: 
The cost of operations for 
each project then needs to 
be established 
Step 11:  
Understand the amount of 
electricity to be consumed by 
each consumer by considering 
the current consumption  
 
Step 12:  
Understand the effects of 
taxation, risk insurance and 
changes in working capital on 
the effects of the model  
 
Step 13: 
Calculate the weighted 
Average Cost of Capital in 
each year of the project 
established in steps 7 and 8  
 
Step 14:  
Calculate the Net Present 
Value of each project 
under consideration. 
 
Step 15:  
Establish the Equivalent 
annual annuity  
Step 16: Analyse and 
interpret the results making 
sure to understand the 
quantitative and qualitative 






Research design  
A qualitative approach will be taken by way of assessing the existing body of literature, 
previously conducted surveys, published information on the criteria the biggest asset managers 
employ when assessing the viability of a company and published information on the reason 
why previous off-grid energy companies management struggled to find funding. This is to 
understand the funding challenges off-grid energy projects in Africa face. One can then 
integrate the existing challenges of achieving project viability into a newly established 
framework for assessing bankability criteria. The research will follow an inductive qualitative 
content analysis approach. The research begins by assessing a wide body of existing literature 
and then attempts to filter the findings into a single conceptual model. This model will then be 
used to interpret what the possible bankability criteria is for standalone off-grid Energy 
solutions. 
Data collection Methods 
The data will be collected by means of gathering publicly available information on investment 
criteria published by large funds, reviewing existing literature and analysing publicly available 
surveys. 
Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis will be to understand what criteria is employed when assessing whether an 
energy project is viable. 
Analytical technique  
The technique will be to conduct an inductive qualitative content analysis by analysing publicly 
available knowledge. The details of the step by step framework to be used are explained below.  
 
Step 1: The first step of the research is to conduct an initial scan of the literature to understand 
what has been covered on the topic of bankability of energy projects with a focus on off-grid 
energy. 
Step 2: This step involves understanding what inclusion criteria should be met before a study 
is included for analytical purposes. The inclusion criteria are as follows: 
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- Studies should not be older than 2012 given there has been several technological 
developments during this period  
- Only reports from reputable industry bodies that have been reviewed will be considered  
- Only studies that have been published in peer reviewed journals will be considered  
- Studies must be free given there is no budget to be allocated for this thesis.  
- Only the top 50 asset managers (by funds under management) will be considered  
- All literature reviewed either needs to be relevant to Africa or at the very least 
developing markets.  
According to Schreier,M. (2012) between 10%-20% of the literature must be reviewed in order 
to develop new concepts. Thus, for the purposes of this study between 10%-20% of the 
literature on bankability criteria for off-grid energy projects will be reviewed.  
 
Step3: Once the relevant literature has been reviewed from multiple sources the next 
consideration is to sort the analysis into three categories  
- Published papers on how to make projects Bankable.  
- Published Surveys on bankability criteria with a focus on Energy  
- Published information on what the asset manager expect to see when assessing an 
investment.  
- Published information on the investments already made in off-grid energy  
 
By sorting the body of knowledge into the above criteria we hope to find where the 
consistencies or inconsistency in understanding project bankability lie. By assessing actual 
investments made on the continent we gain an understanding of whether firms are living up 
to the assessed bankability criteria  
 
Step 4:  At this stage the relevant portions of the literature are extracted and summarised into 
key concepts. By documenting the key concepts in the body of knowledge we intend to gain an 
understanding of what the established criteria is.   
 
Step 5: The commonalities amongst findings are then extrapolated into a criterion based on how 
often the criteria futures in the literature. Thus, we seek to count the number of times a key 
concept future in the body of knowledge. Based on the amount of times we see the criteria 
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future we begin to rank the importance of that criteria in our new model assigning a weight to 
that specific criteria. 
 
Step 6: This steps involves creating a framework that takes into account: 
- The amount of times a theme featured in the literature  
-  Assigning a weigh of importance to an investment criteria based on the number of times it 
futures in the literature 
 
Step 7: The final step is to do a write up of the key findings  
 





































































Step 3: Published papers 
on how to make projects 
Bankable 
 
Step 3:Published Surveys 
on bankability criteria with 
a focus on Energy  
 
 
Step 3: Published 
information on what the 
asset manager expects to 
see when assessing an 
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Step 3: Published 
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in off-grid energy  
 
Step 1: Conduct an initial 
scan of the literature  
 
Step 2: Establish whether 
literature meets the 
inclusion criteria  
 
Step 4: Relevant portions 
of the literature extracted 
and summarised into key 
concepts. 
 
Step 5: Commonalities amongst 
findings are then extrapolated into 
a criterion based on how often the 
criteria futures in the literature 
 
Step 6: Establish an 
investment framework   
 
Step 7: document key 




Discussion of Findings  
 
The following section provides insight to the key findings from the methods employed in 
chapter 3. The findings outline both the outcomes of our analysis on what drives project 
bankability and what technology (off-grid or grid) offers the best return to investors based on 
the discounted free cash flows model.  
 
Return analysis  
 
In this section we provide the key findings found during our analysis of which energy solution 
provides the better estimated risk-adjusted return. In our assessment of which energy solution 
provides the better risk-adjusted return, the Net Present Value model was used. The model takes 
factors such as the cost of capital, changes in the investment climate and changes in key inputs 
needed to determine the profitability of a project. Our study is based on Žižlavský.2014 theory 
of establishing the profitability of innovative projects. This theory is also premised on the Net 
Present Value model. For the purposes of this study we looked at the recently constructed 
Kpone Thermal power station in Ghana and the Zola Electric Infinity solar home system. A 
summary of how the assumptions were formulated are broken down into their key sections.  
 
 
Basic information for comparative Purposes 
In this section we highlight the electrification objective of each Power solution. Kpone was 
built to electrify Ghana mining companies and its general population. The power station was 
built to generate 350 Mega Watts, enough power to electrify 1 million households.  Mining 
companies required 40% of this electricity output and would be supplied directly. The other 
60% of this output would be provided to households via the Electricity Corporation of Ghana 
(ECG) who are the primary electricity distributor in Ghana (Uongozi Institute, 2017). 
Construction of the plant started in 2014 and was completed by June of 2016. The special 
purpose vehicle contracted to build Kpone was Cenpower and they had a 20-year Build 
Operate then transfer agreement with the government of Ghana (Eberhard, Gratwick, Morella 






























Figure 1 Source: (Eberhard, Gratwick, Morella and Antmann, 2017)  
 
The Zola electric unit is hybrid energy solution that allows a household to completely defect 
from the grid. It does this by providing a solar panel and an inverter (energy storage solution) 
to store energy when the sun is not shining ("Zola Nigeria", 2019). That energy can then be 
used at a later stage. For purposes of comparison we assumed that Zola Electric’s off-grid unit 
had a similar objective of electrifying 1million household in Ghana. One Household in Ghana 
requires roughly 5000 KW per annum Energy Commission, Ghana (2018). The Zola Electric 
Infinity Off-grid solution can give energy of up to 2800 KW per annum ("Zola Nigeria", 2019). 
Thus, roughly two of these units would be required for a Ghanaian household to meet its energy 











































Figure 2 Source: ("Zola Nigeria", 2019) 
 
Debt and equity assumptions 
Kpone was financed using a debt to equity ratio of 72/28. The total capital raised to build and 
operate Kpone was $900M (Eberhard, Gratwick, Morella and Antmann, 2017). The syndicate 
of private lenders led by Rand Merchant Bank of South Africa provided $446M of the total 
amount to be repaid over a 15 year period. Development finance institutes provided $202M of 
the total capital requirements of which $93M was for a fuel facility needed to finance the first 
batch of light crude oil needed to operate the plant. The loan term for DFI financing was for 15 
years with a 5 year grace period (Uongozi Institute, 2017). The main assumption is that all loans 
were repayable from the date of operation which was 2016.The below table summarizes the 













Units needed to 
meet demand: 2 
 Number of households 
to be electrified by Zola 
electric: 1M  
























The assumptions for Zola Electric differ slightly to that of Kpone. The key difference is that 
Zola Electric would receive a corporate financing structure whereas Kpone would have 
implemented a project financing structure. Zola electric financing needs could be broken down 
as 66% to fund trade receivables, 25% to fund inventory requirements and 9% to finance capex 
(The International Finance Corporation, 2018). Thus, once the company’s working capital 
requirements were established to finance 1 million households in Ghana it was then we 
established what the financing requirements were. 
 
 Our calculations showed that the company would need $600 million to finance ambitions to 
grow to 1 million households. The average debt/equity ratio reported by a study done by the 
International Finance Corporation. 2018 was 55% debt and 45% equity. It’s important to note 
that equity is significantly more expensive than debt. This is especially true for off-grid projects 
which are predominately funded by venture capital firms that have a very high required rates 




Debt from Private 
Banks: 
$446M with 15 
year loan term 
Debt from DFI’s: 
$202M 
with 15 year loan 






















value of a project due to the high returns required. The average debt financing term for off-grid 
companies was found to be 4 years. The long term split between debt from a commercial entity 
and a DFI was 50/50 (The International Finance Corporation 2018). Thus for purposes of this 
analysis we assume the same splits. Given the above Zola Electric would have to raise $165M 
in DFI funding, $165M in commercial debt and $270M in Equity. All debt carries no grace 
period. The table below summarizes the above stated facts. 
 














Interest rate assumptions 
Kpone debt was financed at the cost of debt plus Libor. Given the risk involved in having your 
interest rate fluctuate RMB had made an offer to have a Libor cap. The facility provided by 
RMB capped how high the variable component of the loan (Libor) could go. This came at a 
once off cost to the SPV (Uongozi Institute, 2017). Given the long-term nature of the loans an 
attempt was made to find the long-term cost of debt in dollar terms. However, in Ghana only 
dollar denominated bonds run for 10 years and not the 15 years as stated in the commercial and 
DFI loan agreements. Further to this, the cost of debt was interpreted to be the cost of borrowing 
dollar denominated debt for Ghana. Given the sovereign is said to be the safest investee, we 
took their bond costs to be the cost of debt (PWC.2017). Thus for purposes of our study Ghana 
10 year dollar bond was the cost of debt at 7.875% ("Ghana, Republic Bond", 2019). The study 
then looked at Libor for the years 2014 to 2019. We then projected forward what Libor could 
possibly be. This was done by establishing the 7-year moving average of Libor for years 2020 
Total debt amount 
raised 
$330M 
Debt from Private Banks: 
$165M with 4-year loan 
term 
Debt from DFI’s: 
$165M 
with 3-year loan term 
Total equity amount 
raised 
$270M 




to 2032 ("6 Month LIBOR Rate - 30 Year Historical Chart", 2019). The assumption is that 
banks would only adjust their Libor rate annually. We also set the Interest rate cap at 1.5% for 
the Libor rate at a cost of 1% of the total commercial loan facility. The total once off cost came 
to $4.4M. The DFI portion of the commercial loans would be at the cost of debt. The below 
table summarizes the detail stated above 
 
 




Assumptions Input Description Actual Amount  Comments on assumptions  
10 Year 
Bond % 7.875% 
We assume that lenders lent to Cenpower at 2013 10 year 
bond rate + Libor. The Uongozi Institute, 2017 stated that the 
SPV borrowed at the cost of debt +Libor.   ("GHANA, 
REPUBLIC Bond", 2019) 
Commercial 
Bank Interest 
Rate % 7.875%+ Libor 
We assume that lenders lent to Cenpower at 2013 10 year 
bond rate + Libor. The Uongozi Institute, 2017 stated that the 
SPV borrowed at the cost of debt +Libor.   ("GHANA, 
REPUBLIC Bond", 2019) 
Interest rate 
Cap % 9.375% 
We assume that if Libor rises above 1.5%, for every 
percentage point above the cap RMB will step in to cover the 
difference Rate assumed. The Uongozi institute stated that an 
agreement was in place to cap the interest rate if it went above 
a certain level 
interest cap 
Lump Sum 
Fee   
                
$4,460,000  
A fee required to be paid in order to qualify for the interest 
rate cap facility. We assume this amount is 1% of the total 
commercial loan raised (Uongozi Institute, 2017) 
Interest 
Rate 
Assumptions Input Description Actual Amount  Comments on assumptions  
Year Libor % rate   
The interest rate on the debt raised for the project was based 
on the short-term money market rate (the London Interbank 
Offered Rate [LIBOR] for US dollars) because the lenders are 
using short-term funding. This means that the interest rate is 
reset to the then-current market rate every six months.  
(Uongozi Institute, 2017) 
2014 Libor % rate 0.329% ("6 Month LIBOR Rate - 30 Year Historical Chart", 2019) 
2015 Libor % rate 0.485% ("6 Month LIBOR Rate - 30 Year Historical Chart", 2019) 
2016 Libor % rate 1.055% ("6 Month LIBOR Rate - 30 Year Historical Chart", 2019) 
2017 Libor % rate 1.474% ("6 Month LIBOR Rate - 30 Year Historical Chart", 2019) 
2018 Libor % rate 2.485% ("6 Month LIBOR Rate - 30 Year Historical Chart", 2019) 
2019 Libor % rate 2.670% ("6 Month LIBOR Rate - 30 Year Historical Chart", 2019) 
2020 Libor % rate 1.921% 
from 2019 until 2034 we take the moving average from the 
previous 7 years  
2021 Libor % rate 1.921%   
2022 Libor % rate 2.094%   
2023 Libor % rate 2.094%   
2024 Libor % rate 2.198%   
2025 Libor % rate 2.198%   
2026 Libor % rate 2.157%   
2027 Libor % rate 2.083%   
2028 Libor % rate 2.083%   
2029 Libor % rate 2.103%   
2030 Libor % rate 2.126%   
2031 Libor % rate 2.130%   






Off-grid energy financing trends show that off-grid companies typically gain local currency 
commercial loans at the cost of debt plus a risk premium between 4%-6% (International Finance 
Corporation, 2018). For purposes of our study we assumed that Zola Electric would be able 
charged a premium of 6% on the cost of debt due to the risky nature of the context it will be 
operating in. The cost of debt was based on the Ghanaian interest rates. This is forecast to be 
16% between the years 2019-2023 (Ghana interest rate.2019). A forecast published by trade 
economics.2019 shows that there are expectations that Ghanaian interest rates will reduce to 
14% over 2024-2028. DFI’s have been known to provide funding to this sector at a cost of 20% 
per annum as a flat rate (international finance corporation.2018). Thus for purposes of our study 
we assume this rate in our calculations. After 2024 our analysis shows Zola Electric will not 
need any further commercial loans. The below table summarizes the above findings. 
Table 6: Interest rate assumption for Zola Electric 
 
Commercial Interest Rate 
Assumptions Input Description Actual Amount  Comments on assumptions  
Ghana Interest Rate 2019-
2023 % 16.000% 
Based on Ghana interest rates in 2019. we take this to be the cost of 
funds for the next 4 years for a local currency loans ("Ghana Interest 
Rate", 2019) 
Ghana Interest Rate 2024-
2028 % 14.000% 
Based on tradeeconimics forecast interest rates we take this to be the 
cost of funds for the next 4 years for a local currency loans ("Ghana 
Interest Rate", 2019) 
Ghana Interest Rate 2029-
2038 % 12.500% 
We assume the long term interest rate will reach Ghana all time low 
rates. we take this to be the cost of funds for the next 4 years for a 
local currency loans ("Ghana Interest Rate", 2019) 
Commercial Bank Interest 
Rate premium % 6.000% 
This Is the upper end of the interest rate cap placed by local banks 
when lending in local currency. They take the cost of funds (interest 
rate) plus a premium between 4%-6%(The International Finance 
Corporation (2018)) 
DFI Interest Rate 
Assumptions Input Description Actual Amount  Comments on assumptions  
  % 20.000% 
 This is based on the average loan terms % reported. (The 
International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
 
 
 Cost of equity assumptions  
 
The cost of equity differed depending on what energy solution you were looking at. This mainly 
came down to the life stage of companies, investor expectations of what they expected for the 
risk they were taking on and the method of finance used. Kpone power station would not have 
been seen as an early start-up company. This is because Kpone used a project financing 
structure that secures its cash flows and allocates the risks to the parties best suited to deal with 
41 
 
that risk. Thus, an investor’s expectation of return would have been reduced. In the case of Zola 
Electric its equity would need to be priced as a start-up given it doesn’t employ a project 
financing structure, is in a relatively new stage of its company life cycle, operates in a somewhat 
untested industry and relies on corporate loans without the benefits of being able to allocate 
risk the same way project finance can. All cost of equity was calculated using CAPM cost of 





Re= Required return on equity or cost of equity  
Rf= The risk free rate  
Beta= The companies stock beta 
Rm-Rf= The risk premium  
Below is a key finding on what the cost of equity was in each instance.  
 
Kpone risk free rate was taken to be the Ghanaian Treasury bill rate. Treasury bills are seen to 
be risk free mainly due to the certainty around a reserve banks ability to pay. Our risk-free rate 
was based on the local currency 2-year bond yields (PWC.2017). This was in line with a survey 
conducted by PWC.2017 that showed that 34% of industry professionals surveyed used these 
instruments when calculating their risk-free rate. The risk-free rates in 2016are based on the 
10-year bond. We assume that the 7.875% on the 10-year bond % can be achieved into 
perpetuity. We thus use it as our rate for 2020-2032. 
 
Betas for private companies could not be found. This is mainly due to the fact that a beta 
coefficient is a measure of the volatility of a particular company share price to the markets 
unsystematic risk (PWC.2017). Given private companies don’t trade on a public market the 
industry norm is   to calculate beta based on companies with similar features to the one you are 
running analysis on (PWC.2017). Given the Ghanaian stock exchange does not have a listed 
independent power producer we looked at oil and gas companies listed on the exchange to gain 
a sense of what the beta is likely to be. Three companies were compared to Kpone, Cenpower 
SPV. These were Tullow oil, Total Ghana and the state-run Ghana Oil Company. Each of the 
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company’s beta were weighted based on market cap to find our reference beta. This came to 
1.56 showing that a company’s stock would be volatile. This methodology is in line with 
industry practice (PWC, 2017). 
 
The risk premium employed was based on the PWC.2017 survey. This survey tried to ascertain 
what risk premium investors used for each industry. Infrastructure had a risk premium that 
ranged between 6.4% and 9% (PWC.2019). We assume 7.4% for purposes of this study based 
on the average of the range presented by PWC. The cost of equity was then calculated for each 
year. Our analysis shows that the expected return averaged 19.4% which is common for African 
infrastructure projects (PWC.2017). The below table gives a summary of the cost of equity 
assumptions for the Kpone power station  






Zola electric’s assumption on the risk free rate are exactly the same as those used for Kpone. 
The beta methodology employed for Kpone is also the same. However, the beta for Kpone has 
Cost of Equity Input Description Actual Amount Cost of equity = risk-free rate of return + beta * risk premium
Risk-free rate of return:
2016 % 7,875%
We assume that lenders lent to Cenpower at 2013 10 year bond rate. We therefore 
use Ghana 10 year bond as the risk free rate The Uongozi Institute, 2017 .   
("GHANA, REPUBLIC Bond", 2019)
2017 % 7,875%
We assume that lenders lent to Cenpower at 2013 10 year bond rate. We therefore 
use Ghana 10 year bond as the risk free rate The Uongozi Institute, 2017 .   
("GHANA, REPUBLIC Bond", 2019)
2018 % 7,875%
We assume that lenders lent to Cenpower at 2013 10 year bond rate. We therefore 
use Ghana 10 year bond as the risk free rate The Uongozi Institute, 2017 .   
("GHANA, REPUBLIC Bond", 2019)
2019 % 7,875%
We assume that lenders lent to Cenpower at 2013 10 year bond rate. We therefore 
use Ghana 10 year bond as the risk free rate The Uongozi Institute, 2017 .   
("GHANA, REPUBLIC Bond", 2019)
2020-2032 % 7,875%
We assume that lenders lent to Cenpower at 2013 10 year bond rate. We therefore 
use Ghana 10 year bond as the risk free rate The Uongozi Institute, 2017 .   
("GHANA, REPUBLIC Bond", 2019)
Tullow Oil Beta Coefficient 1,7 ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019)
Tullow Oil Market Cap in Millions USD 2 883$                           ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019)
Total Petroleum Ghana Beta Coefficient 1,16 ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019)
Total Petroleum Ghana market cap in Millions USD 321$                              ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019)
Ghana Oil Company Beta Coefficient 1,15 ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019)
Ghana Oil Company Market cap in Millions USD 686$                              ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019)
Beta Coefficient 1,56                               
We took the weighted average beta of all companies in the oil and gas sector listed 
on the Ghanaian stock exchange. Oil and Gas companies were picked given they 
represented the closest industry to our Kpone IPP
Risk premium % 7,4%
Based on the PWC annual survey for 2017  on expected risk premium for African 
equities. The average premium required ranged between 6.4%-9% for 2016. for 
purposes of this study we assume the middle between these two ranges (PWC, 2017)
Cost of Equity in each year: %
2016 % 19,4% Calculated
2017 % 19,4% Calculated
2018 % 19,4% Calculated
2019 % 19,4% Calculated
2020-2032 % 19,4% Calculated
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to be adjusted to reflect the incremental volatility you would find for a young company such as 
Zola Electric. The PWC.2017 survey found that a large proportion of the fund managers 
surveyed adjust their beta by 0.5 for companies that have revenues less than $200M. Given the 
start-up nature of Zola Electric the same assumption would apply to them. Thus, the new beta 
for Zola Electric would be 2.06 
The risk premium used for Kpone would remain at 7.4%. In PWC annual fund managers 
surveyed they found companies employ additional risk premium of up to 2% for companies 
that lack track record and 2% for companies where there are significant growth expectations. 
This leads to Zola Electric having a very high cost of equity of that averages 44%. The table 
































Cost of Equity Input Description Actual Amount  
 
Cost of equity = risk-free rate of return + beta * risk premium 
Risk-free rate of 
return:       
2016 % 24.25% 
based on the 2 year fixed note ("Treasury Bill Rates – Bank of Ghana", 
2019). In a 2017 survey by PWC investors 34% used the local 
currency bond yields as the Risk free rate (PWC, 2017) 
2017 % 15.00% 
based on the 1 year fixed note ("Treasury Bill Rates – Bank of Ghana", 
2019). In a 2017 survey by PWC investors 34% used the local 
currency bond yields as the Risk free rate (PWC, 2017) 
2018 % 14.50% 
based on the 1 year fixed note ("Treasury Bill Rates – Bank of Ghana", 
2019). In a 2017 survey by PWC investors 34% used the local 
currency bond yields as the Risk free rate (PWC, 2017) 
2019 % 15.50% 
based on the 1 year fixed note ("Treasury Bill Rates – Bank of Ghana", 
2019). In a 2017 survey by PWC investors 34% used the local 
currency bond yields as the Risk free rate (PWC, 2017) 
2020-2032 % 15.50% We assume the same rate into perpetuity  
Tullow Oil Beta Coefficient 1.7 ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019) 
Tullow Oil Market Cap  in Millions USD 
 $                                    
2,883  ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019) 
Total Petroleum 
Ghana Beta Coefficient 1.16 ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019) 
Total Petroleum 
Ghana market cap  in Millions USD 
 $                                        
321  ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019) 
Ghana Oil Company Beta Coefficient 1.15 ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019) 
Ghana Oil Company 
Market cap in Millions USD 
 $                                    
686  ("GCB.GH - GCB Bank Ltd Profile | Reuters", 2019) 
Beta Coefficient 
                                          
1.56  
We took the weighted average beta of all companies in the oil and 
gas sector listed on the Ghanaian stock exchange. Oil and Gas 
companies were picked given they represented the closest industry 
to our off-grid companies  
Beta Adjustment Coefficient 
                                          
0.50  
Industry analysts surveyed state they adjust beta premium for 
companies with revenues less that $200M (PWC,2017) 
Risk premium % 7.4% 
Based on the PWC annual survey for 2017  on expected risk 
premium for African equities. The average premium required ranged 
between 6.4%-9% for 2016. for purposes of this study we assume 
the highest range  (PWC, 2017) 
Risk premium: lack of 
track record   2.0% 
We add an additional 2.0% for lack of track record which most 
companies engaged in off grd are in. According to a recent PWC 




expectations   2.0% 
We add an additional 2.0% for given off-grid energy has seen 
extreme growth indices and there are significant growth 
expectations. According to a recent PWC survey this is the premium 
added by investment companies  (PWC, 2017) 
Cost of Equity in each 
year: %     
2016 % 52.9% Calculated 
2017 % 43.6% Calculated 
2018 % 43.1% Calculated 
2019 % 44.1% Calculated 
2020-2032 % 44.1% Calculated 
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Fuel Supply Assumptions  
 
The fuel supply assumptions apply only to Kpone Power Station. The background to this 
analysis is that Kpone was meant to be a power station that ran on Natural Gas. However, the 
transition to Natural gas could only take place by the year 2018. In the meantime, Kpone has 
had to use Light Crude Oil (LCO) to operate the PowerStation. This was mainly because the 
West Africa Gas Pipeline that would transport gas from Nigeria to Ghana had not materialized 
in time. It was for this reason LCO had been used as a temporary measure. The discovery of 
natural gas off the cost of Ghana meant the project would be able to use gas soon. Cenpower 
was also heavily incentivized to switch to gas in 2 years given their return on equity increased 
(Uongozi Institute, 2017). Thus, our assumptions assume that from the start date of 2016 
Cenpower will switch to Natural gas by the end of 2018.  
 
Cenpower bought LCO at the prevailing market price from Vitol (Uongozi Institute, 2017). To 
ascertain this price we found 2016 to 2018 actual prices Cenpower would have paid for LCO 
based on the price of Western Texas Intermediate. Thereafter to ascertain the cost of Natural 
gas, the futures price was used. The underlying assumption is Cenpower would enter into some 
form of hedging arrangement where they would purchase natural gas futures annually. Futures 
contracts could be found from years 2019 to 2023. Thereafter we use the moving average to 
ascertain the likely price of natural gas using a moving average. Zola electric had no 


























Fuel Supply Assumption Input Description Actual Amount Comments on assumptions 
Fuel Supply Agreement with Vitol structured on a 
take and pay basis 
Under this agreement Cenpower pays the market price for light crude oil at the 
prevailing market price with ECG taking the risk for price fluctuations. This would be 
a fixed fee given the Electricity Corporation of Ghana would take the risk of price 
fluctuations (Uongozi Institute, 2017)
Additional Storage facility built by Vitol 
This construction cost was not part of the orginal Engineering Procurement and 
construction contract. This cost is reflected in the loan under FMO Fuel Facility 
(Uongozi Institute, 2017)
Additional once off fuel required Cenpower at 50 
days Stock on Hand of LCO
This construction cost was not part of the orginal Engineering Procurement and 
construction contract. This cost is reflected in the loan under FMO Fuel Facility 
(Uongozi Institute, 2017)
Distillate Fuel per Unit capacity : 5,157 
barrels/GWh ("Volta River Authority | Kpone Thermal Power Station", 2019)
Natural Gas per Unit capacity: 11,800 
MMBTU/GWh ("Volta River Authority | Kpone Thermal Power Station", 2019)
Number of Units units 2 ("Volta River Authority | Kpone Thermal Power Station", 2019)
Light Crude Oil Prices ( Based on the West 
Texas Intermediate )
2014
Average Price over the year in USD 
Actuals 92.80$                           ("Crude Oil WTI (NYM $/bbl) Front Month", 2019)
2015
Average Price over the year in USD 
Actuals 48.90$                           ("Crude Oil WTI (NYM $/bbl) Front Month", 2019)
2016
Average Price over the year in USD 
Actuals 47.00$                           ("Crude Oil WTI (NYM $/bbl) Front Month", 2019)
2017
Average Price over the year in USD 
Actuals 50.80$                           ("Crude Oil WTI (NYM $/bbl) Front Month", 2019)
2018
Average Price over the year in USD 
Actuals 64.80$                           ("Crude Oil WTI (NYM $/bbl) Front Month", 2019)
2016 Futures  Price for Light Crude Oil 46.00$                           
assumption is contracts are purchased Annualy with the first purchased on the 1st of 
Jan ("Crude Oil WTI (NYM $/bbl) Front Month", 2019)
2017 Futures  Price for Light Crude Oil 52.37$                           
assumption is contracts are purchased Annualy with the first purchased on the 1st of 
Jan ("Crude Oil WTI (NYM $/bbl) Front Month", 2019)
2018 Futures  Price for Light Crude Oil 64.30$                           
assumption is contracts are purchased Annualy with the first purchased on the 1st of 
Jan ("Crude Oil WTI (NYM $/bbl) Front Month", 2019)
Gas Prices in MMBTU
2019
Average Price over the year in USD 
measure in 1 MMBTU Actuals 2.32$                             ("Natural Gas Futures Price - Investing.com ZA", 2019)
2019 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.92$                             
assumption is contracts are purchased Annualy with the first purchased on the 1st of 
Jan ("Natural Gas Futures Price - Investing.com ZA", 2019)
2020 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.54$                             
assumption is contracts are purchased Annualy with the first purchased on the 1st of 
Jan ("Natural Gas Futures Price - Investing.com ZA", 2019)
2021 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.69$                             
assumption is contracts are purchased Annualy with the first purchased on the 1st of 
Jan ("Natural Gas Futures Price - Investing.com ZA", 2019)
2022 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.60$                             
assumption is contracts are purchased Annualy with the first purchased on the 1st of 
Jan ("Natural Gas Futures Price - Investing.com ZA", 2019)
2023 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.61$                             from 2023 until 2034 we take the moving average from the previous 5 years 
2024 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.67$                             
2025 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.62$                             
2026 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.64$                             
2027 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.63$                             
2028 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.64$                             
2029 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.64$                             
2030 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.63$                             
2031 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.64$                             
2032 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.63$                             
2033 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.64$                             
2034 Futures  Price for Natraul Gas 2.64$                             
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Capacity Utilization and Volume Growth Assumptions 
Kpone Power Station capacity was 350MW. This capacity was enough to power 1 million 
households. However, how capacity is used is dependant on mining companies consumption 
which accounts for 40% of the off taker agreement and with the remaining 60% designated for 
households. A study by Sarkodie, 2017 looked at exactly how they expected Ghanaian 
electricity consumption to grow. They factored things such as industrial, economic and GDP 
per capita growth. Their analysis showed that they expected annual electricity consumption to 
grow from 8.52 billion kWh Per annum to 9.56 billion kWh per annum by 2030 Sarkodie, 2017. 
This growth represents a 6% compound annual growth rate in electricity consumption. We thus 
assume this growth rate from 2020 until Kpone reaches a capacity of 85%. Based on our 
analysis this figure is reached in 2029.  The actual consumption of electricity for the periods 
2016 to 2019 were taken from the Volta River Authority, the state-owned entity responsible for 







































Description Actual Amount  Comments on assumptions  
Hourly capacity MWH 350 (Volta River Authority, 2017) 
Yearly Capacity in 
GWH GWH 3066   
Yearly Capacity in 
MWH MWH 3066000   
Yearly Capacity in 
KWH KWH 3066000000   
        
Distillate Fuel per 
Unit: 5,157 
barrels/GWh barrels/GWh 5157 
Distillate Fuel per Unit: 5,157 barrels/GWh (Volta River Authority, 2017). 
Given this assumption we convert this figure into our cost of sales figure turning 
it into a KWH figure 
Natural Gas per Unit: 
11,800 
MMBTU/GWh  MMBTU/GWh 11800 
Distillate Fuel per Unit: 5,157 barrels/GWh (Volta River Authority, 2017). 
Given this assumption we convert this figure into our cost of sales figure turning 
it into a KWH figure 
        
2016 % Output P.A 5.50% (Volta River Authority, 2017) 
2017 % Output P.A 6.60% (Volta River Authority, 2017) 
2018 % Output P.A 40% ("Volta River Authority | Kpone Thermal Power Station", 2019) 






will grow as 
forecast from 
8.52Billion KWH 
to 9.56 billiob 




by 2030. We 
assume this 
capacity is met by 
Kpone by 2030 6% (Sarkodie, 2017 
2020 % Output P.A 51%   
2021 % Output P.A 54%   
2022 % Output P.A 57%   
2023 % Output P.A 60%   
2024 % Output P.A 64%   
2025 % Output P.A 68%   
2026 % Output P.A 72%   
2027 % Output P.A 76%   
2028 % Output P.A 81%   
2029 % Output P.A 85%   
2030 % Output P.A 85%   
2031 % Output P.A 85%   
2032 % Output P.A 85%   
2033 % Output P.A 85%   
2034 % Output P.A 85%   
2035 % Output P.A 85%   
2036 % Output P.A 85%   
49 
 
The assumptions made for Zola electric are around the depth of distribution that can be achieved 
with time. These assumptions try and understand at what point we can expect Zola Electric to 
reach 1million households. Based on a study done by the international finance corporation 
2018, the expected compound annual growth rate of solar home systems are 87% between the 
years 2018- 2022. However, we assume that the growth rate will slow down to 45% in line with 
industry projections from 2023- 2032. The model seeks to make a comparison between Zola 
Electric and Kpone. Given this we stop assuming growth in distribution once the Zola Elctectric 
hits 2 000 000 units, roughly the equivalent amount of units needed to power the same amount 
of households Kpone can power. Based on the current growth rates we project Zola electric to 



























Table 11: Capacity utilization assumptions for Zola Electric 
 
Growth Expectations 
in volumes sold 
Input 
Description Actual Amount  Comments on assumptions  
2020-2022 annual 
CAGR growth rate % 87% 
The off-grid market trends report projects a CAGR of 87% in 
terms of units sold with revenues expected to rise faster  (The 
International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2023-2032 annual 
CAGR growth rate % 85% 
Based on Pico systems that are beginning to reach saturation 
(The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2019 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 133333 Based on 2020-2022 CAGR growth Rates 
2020 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 266667 Based on 2020-2022 CAGR growth Rates 
2021 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 400000 Based on 2020-2022 CAGR growth Rates 
2022 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 748000 
based on the fact that by 2022 24M units that are SHS and plug 
and play will be sold (The International Finance Corporation 
(2018)) 
2023 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 1383800 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2024 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2025 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2026 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2027 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2028 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2029 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2030 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2031 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2032 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2033 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2034 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2035 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2036 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2037 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2038 total zola electric 
Unit Sales Unit Sales 2000000 Based on 2022-2032 CAGR growth Rates 
2039 total zola electric 




Political and credit Risk Insurance and credit risk guarantee’s 
One of the preconditions to raising finance for Cenpower was the fact that the lead bank, Rand 
Merchant Bank, insisted on political risk insurance. This insurance was to cover the risk of 
expropriation of the project, war, political unrest, the availability of US Dollars, ability to 
transfer US dollars out the country and most importantly the failure of the government of Ghana 
(GOG) to pay under its guarantee to the ECG (Uongozi Institute, 2017). Marsh JLT Specialty, 
2019 specializes in providing political risk insurance for infrastructure around the world, 
including Ghana. The report stated that the typical insurance provided would be 2.5% of the 
value of the asset (Marsh JLT Specialty, 2019). We assume this to be the value of the premium 
paid over the life span of the project.  
 
The other insurance taken by Cenpower was commercial risk insurance. Commercial risks are 
the standard risks that one can encounter from any project. These include but are not limited to 
construction risks, usage risks, revenue risks, operating risk and macro-economic risks to name 
a few. For purposes of this study we assumed a insurance rate of 0.5% of the asset value. 
 
Cenpower was also obligated under its agreement with RMB to get some form of insurance 
against default from the ECG. Typically, a bank would often arrange a letter of credit to 
guarantee payment after a certain amount of time has lapsed or if default has taken effect. In 
the case of Cenpower this letter of credit was there to protect it from the ECG failure to pay for 
the fuel it had used on time. Letters of credit are usually charged at a fee of between 1% and 
2% of the transaction value. In the case of Cenpower we have assumed a letter of credit would 
be given to Cenpower at 1% (Uongozi Institute, 2017).  
 
Given that Zola Electric doesn’t take on a complex project financing structure there are no 
added insurances that would be taken by Zola Electric. The below diagram provides an 










Table 12: insurance assumptions for Kpone 
 
Credit risk assumption  Input Description 
Actual 
Amount  Comments on assumptions  
Bank letter of credit    1.000% 
This was used to cover Cenpower from non-
payment for fuel from the Electricity Corporation 
of Ghana. Letters of Credit are typically between 
1-2% in cost depending on credit risk. We assume 
this cost is 1% of revenue (Uongozi Institute, 
2017) 
 
Political Risk Insurance       
2016-2032 
Risk premium P.A 
based on the cost of the 
value of the asset 2.50% 
In addition to the sovereign credit risk pricing 
ranges, this Risk Outlook contains pricing 
information on confiscation, expropriation, 
nationalization and deprivation (CEND), full 
political violence and terrorism and sabotage 
insurance (Marsh JLT Specialty, 2019) 
Commercial Risk 
Insurance 
Risk premium P.A 
based on the cost of the 
value of the asset 0.50% 
85%of the total asset is covered at a rate of 0.5% 





As stated before, with regards to the electricity output for Cenpower, 60% of the electricity 
output at Kpone will be supplied to the ECG. It is assumed this electricity is for households and 
business consumption. The other 40% of the output would be sold directly to mining companies 
(Uongozi Institute, 2017). The two entities don’t attract the same Tariff rate. Actual Tariff 
imposed on mining companies between the years 2016 to 2018 were almost 2 times higher than 
those imposed on the ECG. The mining Tariff was $0.23 per KWH were as those imposed on 
the ECG were $0.12 (Energy Commission Ghana, 2018). Given the differences in Tariffs we 
blend the two tariffs based on their weight of how much power is used by each entity. The 
blended tariff we arrive at is $0.164 for the years 2016-2018 
 
Part of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) states that the tariff awarded to Cenpower was 
meant to cover its debt obligations, fixed costs, variable costs, Fuel costs and allow it to make 
a return on equity (Uongozi Institute, 2017). The tariff was also awarded in US Dollars but 
payments would be made in Ghanaian Cedi. The initial tariff awarded was for $0.22 per kWh 
based on the price of LCO being $100. The tariff would adjust based on this benchmark price. 
The price of this tariff would reduce when the project switches to Gas. Based on the above 
stated set of facts we calculate an adjustment factor that uses the actual tariff charge and what 
has been agreed by Cenpower and the regulatory body of Ghana to establish what the likely 
tariff will be going forward. Thus, based on the predicted cost of fuel we ascertain what the 
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likely tariff will be in going forwards. Once the project moves to using natural gas as its fuel 
source we adjust the tariff based on the natural gas fuel source used. Tariff for natural gas were  







Revenue Input Description Actual Amount Comments on assumptions 
2012 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 1.75 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2013 Average Cedi/US Dollar   2.12 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2014 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 2.79 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2015 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 3.63 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2016 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 4.085 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2017 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 4.55 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2018 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 4.65 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
Annual Compound devalution rate % 14.98%
We assume that the Ghanaian cedi will continue to devalue at the compound 
devalution  rate 
2019 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 5.35 from 2019 until 2032 we take the moving average from the previous 3 years 
2020 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 6.15
2021 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 6.15
2022 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 7.07
2023 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 7.07
2024 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 8.13
2025 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 8.13
2026 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 9.34
2027 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 9.34
2028 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 10.74
2029 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 10.74
2030 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 12.35
2031 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 12.35
2032 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 14.20
Off Taker Agreement: 60% supplied to the ECG % 60% (Uongozi Institute, 2017)
Off Taker Agreement: 40% supplied to mining 
companies % 40% (Uongozi Institute, 2017)
Tariff per KWH based on a barrel of oil (LCO) 
costing $100. Tariff to reduce or increase based 
on this price USD/KWH 0.22$                             (Uongozi Institute, 2017)
Tariff Adjustement based on Price of LCO 100$                              We reduce/increase the tariff based on the indcies of the new price of LCO to $100
Adjustment Factor 1.38 Based on the actual tariffs of 2016-2018
Tariff Adjustement based on Price of Natrual 
Gas 4.065$                           
We reduce/increase the tariff based on the indcies of the new price of natrual gas to 
the price of natrual gas in 2014 $4.065 ( the same LCO was last at $100)  ("Natural 
Gas Futures Price - Investing.com ZA", 2019)
Inflation Rate Ghana % 9.58%
We assume that there will be no change to the Ghanian inflation rate over the 
investement period ("Ghana Inflation Rate", 2019)
Actual 2016-2018 Tariff: Mining usd/kwh 0.230$                          (ENERGY COMMISSION, GHANA, 2018)
Actual 2016-2018 Tariff: ECG usd/kwh 0.120$                          (ENERGY COMMISSION, GHANA, 2018)
Actual 2016-2018 Tariff usd/kwh 0.164$                          (ENERGY COMMISSION, GHANA, 2018)
2019 Tariff usd/kwh 0.233$                          
2020 Tariff usd/kwh 0.211$                          
2021 Tariff usd/kwh 0.220$                          
2022 Tariff usd/kwh 0.215$                          
2023 Tariff usd/kwh 0.215$                          
2024 Tariff usd/kwh 0.220$                          
2025 Tariff usd/kwh 0.216$                          
2026 Tariff usd/kwh 0.217$                          
2027 Tariff usd/kwh 0.217$                          
2028 Tariff usd/kwh 0.217$                          
2029 Tariff usd/kwh 0.217$                          
2030 Tariff usd/kwh 0.217$                          
2031 Tariff usd/kwh 0.217$                          




The revenue assumption for an off-grid company are a lot more straight-forward. Typically, 
off-grid companies sell their solar home systems on a financing arrangement with the consumer. 
The typical length of these financing arrangements is 4-5 years. The typical structure of these 
arrangements is to make consumers to pay a once off deposit. Thereafter the consumer is 
expected to make monthly payments towards acquiring the system. The primary risk of this 
sales model is that of default. At that point should a consumer fail to pay, the system can be 
remotely switched off (The International Finance Corporation 2018). In the case of Zola 
Electric, they will be offering their new Zola Infinity unit after a deposit of $152 is paid. The 
payback period for the unit is 5 years with a monthly expected leasing fee of $14.13. Although 
all amounts are expected to be received in Ghanaian Cedi, these amounts are converted to US 
dollars. The below table shows a summary of the assumptions made to reach the Revenue 
number 








Revenue Input Description Actual Amount Comments on assumptions 
2012 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 1.75 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2013 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 2.12 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2014 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 2.79 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2015 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 3.63 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2016 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 4.085 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2017 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 4.55 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
2018 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 4.65 ("XE: USD / GHS Currency Chart. US Dollar to Ghanaian Cedi Rates", 2019)
Annual Compound devalution rate % 14.98%
We assume that the Ghanaian cedi will continue to devalue at the compound 
devalution  rate 
2019 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 5.35 from 2019 until 2032 we take the moving average from the previous 3 years 
2020 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 6.15
2021 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 6.15
2022 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 7.07
2023 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 7.07
2024 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 8.13
2025 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 8.13
2026 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 9.34
2027 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 9.34
2028 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 10.74
2029 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 10.74
2030 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 12.35
2031 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 12.35
2032 Average Cedi/US Dollar Exchange rate 14.20
Off Taker Agreement: 60% supplied to the ECG % 60%
Our Assumption is that all of the energy sold to the ECG was for household 
consumption. We Therefore adjust the number of households Kpone actually 
powered to provide a fair comparison (Uongozi Institute, 2017)
Off Taker Agreement: 40% supplied to mining 
companies % 40% (Uongozi Institute, 2017)
Monthly Payment for Off Grid Unit based on the 
cost of Diesel USD 14.13$                                    ("Zola Nigeria", 2019)
Number of years for monthly repayments Years 5.00 ("Zola Nigeria", 2019)
Annual Payments for Off Grid Solution USD 169.60$                                 This will be the annual payment for the next 5 years ("Zola Nigeria", 2019)
Deposit Naira 55000.00 ("Zola Nigeria", 2019)





Cost of sales  
 
To find the cost of sales figure the Volta River Authority financial statements were used. We 
looked for what comparable power stations pay per Giga Watt Hour (GWH) in cost of sales in 
Ghana. Based on the Volta River Authorities financial statements 2018, this amount was found 
to be $42288 per GWH. Thus in every year where the production output changes for Kpone we 
apply this amount per GWH 
 
Table 14: Cost of sales assumptions for Kpone 
 
 
Cost of Sales Input Description Actual Amount  Comments on assumptions  
Distribution costs for Northern 
Electricity Distribution Company 
(Nedco) Cedi 238720000 
Nedco distributed 1236 GHW of energy 40% of Kpone total 
capacity for the 2017 calendar year. We assume that the 
distribution costs are the same (Volta River Authority, 2017). 
Distribution costs for Northern 
Electricity Distribution Company 
(Nedco ) per GHW USD 
 $                         
42,448  This becomes the distribution cost for every GWH distributed  
 
  
The assumptions surrounding off-grid energy differ. In formulating the cost of sales, the 
international finance energy 2018 report breaks these costs as 35% for the PV, 7% for the LED, 
49% for the battery and 8% for the labour and circuitry required to connect homes. Overall the 
costs related to a small SHS that only produces 35 watts. Our unit, however, produces 320 
watts. Thus, the assumption made was to convert the stated cost of sales for a 35watt unit into 
a cost per watt. This number was found to be $2.22 per watt. We then multiplied this cost by 
the 320 watts each unit produces to find the overall cost of sale per unit. This came to $711 per 
unit.  
 
The international finance report shows that the cost of these units is expected to decrease with 
time at CAGR rate of 7% between the years 2016-2022 and again by 5% over 2024-2032 (The 
international finance 2018). We thus reduce the cost of these units until a point in time they 








Table 15: Cost of sales assumptions for Zola Electric 
 
Cost of Unit  Input Description Actual Amount  Comments on assumptions  
 small solar home system output watts 35  (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
Costs Per unit for a small solar 
home system USD  $  77.80  This is based on a system that produces 35watts  
Cost of unit per watt produced usd/watt  $  2.22  
A key assumption here is the cost per unit stays relatively 
the same as the output increases (The International Finance 
Corporation (2018)) 
Watts produced by Zola electric watts 320 ("Zola Nigeria", 2019) 
Cost of manufacturing a 
premium unit USD  $ 711.31    
Costs Per unit for a small solar 
home system cagr 2016-2022 % -7%  (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
Costs Per unit for a small solar 
home system cagr 2024-2032   -5%  (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2033-2038     we assume costs remain the same 
2016 USD  $ 711.31   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2017 USD  $ 663.51   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2018 USD  $ 618.93   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2019 USD  $ 577.33   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2020 USD  $ 538.54   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2021 USD  $ 502.35   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2022 USD  $ 468.59   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2023 USD  $ 445.16   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2024 USD  $  422.90   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2025 USD  $ 401.76   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2026 USD  $ 381.67   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2027 USD  $ 362.59   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2028 USD  $ 344.46   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2029 USD  $ 327.23   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2030 USD  $ 310.87   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2031 USD  $ 295.33   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2032 USD  $ 280.56   (The International Finance Corporation (2018)) 
2033 USD  $ 280.56    
2034 USD  $ 280.56    
2035 USD  $ 280.56    
2036 USD  $ 280.56    
2037 USD  $ 280.56    
2038 USD  $ 280.56    




As part of the project financing arrangement all administrative expenses were to be handled by 
the Sumitomo Corporation of Japan. In return for the management of the power station 
Sumitomo would charge a fee. The operating expenses to be managed by Sumitomo were 
salaries and related expenses, material and spares consumed, repairs and maintenance, 
employee benefits, audit fees and other operating expenses (Uongozi Institute, 2017). No 
further information was published on how this fee would be paid to Sumitomo. Thus we looked 
at the VRA’s actual expenses to get a sense of exactly how much this could possibly cost. The 
operating expenses cost is calculated based on a % of revenue. The VRA currently has its 
operating expenses at 10.4% of revenue. This cost is based on their 2018 financial statements 
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(Volta River Authority, 2018). Given Kpone will steadily reach its capacity over time we 
assume the Sumitomo cost is a fixed cost of 18% at the beginning of the project early life. The 
18% is based on the fact that the project seeks to reach a operating cost as a % of revenue of 
10.4% over time. This percentage is based on a capacity utilization of 80% being reached. Thus 
the 18% reflects the fact that the PowerStation operates at below capacity for a period of time. 
Once the project reaches its full capacity, this cost reduces to 9.5% based on the above stated 
logic. The below table shows the breakdown of how these costs reduce. 
 
Table 16: Operating expense assumptions for Kpone 
 
Operating Expenses  Input Description 
Actual 
Amount  Comments on assumptions  
Administrative Expenses 
handled by Sumitomo 
Corporation of Japan  % 8% 
These include: 
Salaries and Related expenses 
Material and Spares consumed 




The % assumption of revenue is based on the VRA 
actuals over financial years 2016 and 2017 (Volta 
River Authority, 2017). we assume these costs start 
by being 18% of revenue and gradually reach a state 
where they are 10% as capacity increases. The VRA 
reported this cost line item as 10.4% of revenue 
Administrative Expenses 
handled by Sumitomo 
Corporation of Japan  % 18.0% This represents the top end of costs  
2016 % 17.5%   
2017   17.3%   
2018   14.0%   
2019   13.2%   
2020   12.9%   
2021   12.9%   
2022   12.6%   
2023   12.3%   
2024   12.0%   
2025   11.6%   
2026   11.2%   
2027   10.8%   
2028   10.4%   
2029   9.9%   
2030   9.5%   
2031   9.5%   
2032   9.5%   
 
The cost assumptions for Zola Electric were established using a different set of assumptions. 
The first set of assumptions were based on the international finance corporation 2018 report on 
the off-grid sector. This report stated that off-grid companies spend roughly $10M a year on 
research and development. This cost is especially needed given the young nature of the 
technology used by off-grid companies. This cost remains fixed for the years 2019-2024. 
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Thereafter, as the company reaches maturity, we assume that the cost of RandD will resemble 
closer to that of other power companies in the sector. This cost was 3% based on a study by the 
craft company 2017. We assume this cost into perpetuity. The international finance corporation 
report highlighted that most of the operating expenses of an off-grid company can be captured 
under these terms as being soft costs. Soft costs are defined as corporate costs, marketing and 
transportation, customer acquisition costs, transaction costs and after sales costs. Each cost is 
explained in below.  
 
Corporate costs are those costs associated with acquiring the skilled personal needed to 
successfully run an off-grid company. One of the biggest motivators for these high costs are the 
fact that off-grid companies working capital is poor if receivables are not sold. Thus, the 
presence of a skilled corporate team enables the company to use this personal to sell this debt. 
Marketing and transportation costs are the costs of building a brand that will resonate with 
consumers and all transportation of the units from where they are sourced to where they are 
finally sold to. Customer acquisition costs are the costs associated with acquiring one customer. 
This includes the payment of a sales force to sell the unit to consumers and install the unit. High 
transaction costs occur given you still need a large sales force to collect the monthly payment 
or conduct repossessions in the case of default. The after sales costs are the costs incurred to 
have service personal to conduct maintenance on the unit or call centre agents to assist with 
problems with the unit such as fault logging.   
 
To ascertain what the above cost would translate to per unit we looked at the work done by the 
international energy agency.2019 on off-grid SHS.  This cost was reported to be $1 kWh with 
a significant chance this cost would reduce over time. The international renewable energy 
agency stated the cost would reduce to $0.4 per kWh by 2025. There after it is projected to 

















In order to ascertain the capex costs for a natural gas power station the US energy department 
has a comprehensive data set that looked at the capex charge for natural gas stations across the 
world. The departments analysis found that on average a natural gas power station has a capex 
charge rate of roughly $800 KW produced. However, with time this cost declines by 1% per 
year as learning takes place. This phenomenon is reflected in our assumptions. 
Operating Costs Input Description Actual Amount Comments on assumptions 
2019-2024 Investments in technology: USD 10,000,000$                         
This cost represents the research and development costs that come with 
producing these units. We estimate an annual $10M per year based on recent 
estimates. This amount stays fixed thereafter it becomes a % of revenue (The 
International Finance Corporation (2018))
2025-2038 Investments in technology: % 3%
This represents the average percentage of revenue spent on r&d (The Craft Company, 
2017)
Marketing and Transportation USD/watt See soft costs These costs are included in the definition of soft costs 
High corporate costs: % See soft costs
Given the upfront investments and long-payment periods, suppliers that can
sell consumer-receivables can access more working capital, reduce credit risk, and 
scale faster. This leads many suppliers to invest in skilled corporate teams to raise 
such debt.(The International Finance Corporation (2018))
High customer acquisition costs: USD/watt See soft costs
PAYGO SHS sales require a trained sales force to educate consumers
on navigating and maintaining the technology, and on payment terms and 
procedures. Most suppliers invest in and maintain large, commissioned sales 
teams.for purposes of this study we assume the same go to market strategy(The 
International Finance Corporation (2018))
High transaction costs: USD/watt see soft costs
Suppliers often maintain a secondary team to recoup payments (through follow-
ups/repossessions) (The International Finance Corporation (2018))
High after-sales costs: USD/watt see soft costs
Often, a third, localized team is required to undertake post-sales servicing.
Unlike smaller products that can be sent to a central service center for repair or 
replacement, servicing larger products necessitates a decentralized team. Major 
suppliers typically invest in a callcenter and a local repair laboratory.(The International 
Finance Corporation (2018))
Total Soft Costs USD/watt 1.00$                                      
This figure represents the cost of Customer Acquisition, Transaction costs and after 
sales costs. IRENA reported this cost to be $1 per watt with a significant chance they 
reduce with time as scale is achieved (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2019)
Reduction in Soft Costs as scale is achieved 2019-
2025 % CAGR -12%
The Assumption is soft costs match those of mini grid with scale. These were reported 
to be $0.1-$0.4 per watt. To be conservative we assume $0.4 per watt. This represents 
a (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2019)
Reduction in Soft Costs as scale is achieved 2026-
2038 % CAGR -7%
2019 USD/watt 0.88$                                      
2020 USD/watt 0.78$                                      
2021 USD/watt 0.69$                                      
2022 USD/watt 0.61$                                      
2023 USD/watt 0.54$                                      
2024 USD/watt 0.48$                                      
2025 USD/watt 0.42$                                      
2026 USD/watt 0.39$                                      
2027 USD/watt 0.36$                                      
2028 USD/watt 0.34$                                      
2029 USD/watt 0.31$                                      
2030 USD/watt 0.29$                                      
2031 USD/watt 0.27$                                      
2032 USD/watt 0.25$                                      
2033 USD/watt 0.24$                                      
2034 USD/watt 0.22$                                      
2035 USD/watt 0.20$                                      
2036 USD/watt 0.19$                                      
2037 USD/watt 0.18$                                      




Table 18: CAPEX assumptions for Kpone 
 
Capex Charge Input Description 
Actual 
Amount  Comments on assumptions  
% rate at which Capex 
declines in cost  % -1% 
These assumption are from the US energy department 
that assume that capex costs for a natural gas plant 
decline with time due to learning ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
Power Plant Capacity in 
KWH kWh 350000   
2015 $/kw 
 $                         
800.00  
These assumptions are from the US energy department 
that assume that capex costs for a natural gas plant 
decline with time due to learning ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2016 $/kw 
 $                         
792.00  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2017 $/kw 
 $                         
784.08  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2018 $/kw 
 $                         
776.24  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2019 $/kw 
 $                         
768.48  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2020 $/kw 
 $                         
760.79  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2021 $/kw 
 $                         
753.18  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2022 $/kw 
 $                         
745.65  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2023 $/kw 
 $                         
738.20  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2024 $/kw 
 $                         
730.81  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2025 $/kw 
 $                         
723.51  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2026 $/kw 
 $                         
716.27  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2027 $/kw 
 $                         
709.11  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2028 $/kw 
 $                         
702.02  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2029 $/kw 
 $                         
695.00  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2030 $/kw 
 $                         
688.05  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2031 $/kw 
 $                         
681.17  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
2032 $/kw 
 $                         
674.35  ("2017 ATB", 2019) 
 
 
No capex assumptions were established for off-grid companies. This is mainly because the 
products are sold as a consumer goods product sourced from third party suppliers as opposed 






WACC schedule 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
kd 4,945% 6,199% 6,467% 6,684% 6,690% 6,681% 6,671% 6,673% 6,674% 6,676% 6,678% 6,682%
t 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Wd 71% 72% 76% 75% 74% 72% 71% 69% 66% 64% 60% 57%
ke 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4%
We 29% 28% 24% 25% 26% 28% 29% 31% 34% 36% 40% 43%
WACC = kd (1-t) * Wd + ke * We 9,205% 9,885% 9,579% 9,885% 10,046% 10,212% 10,397% 10,656% 10,955% 11,302% 11,710% 12,196%
WACC schedule 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
kd 6,686% 6,693% 6,705% 6,730% 6,810% 0,000%
t 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Wd 52% 46% 39% 30% 16% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ke 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4% 19,4%
We 48% 54% 61% 70% 84% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100%
WACC = kd (1-t) * Wd + ke * We 12,786% 13,516% 14,445% 15,664% 17,336% 19,180% 19,408% 19,408% 19,408% 19,408%
WACC schedule 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038
kd 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000%
t 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Wd 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ke 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0%
We 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
WACC = kd (1-t) * Wd + ke * We 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966%
Working Capital 
The working capital assumptions for Kpone were based on PWC report on working capital 
management. The report took a sample of Utilities across the world and looked at what their 
working capital positions are over time. The report then reports the day’s inventory, receivables 
and payables were for each year from 2016 to 2019. For purposes of this study we assumed that 
the days inventory numbers would not change for 2020- 2035.  
 
With regards to Zola Electric’s working capital assumptions, we looked at what the income 
statement reported as sales. We then assumed that the days payable, receivable and inventory 




Given the above stated assumptions Kpone’s WACC started off as low in the first few years 
(9,2%) of the project with the expectation that this is set to increase with time due to the capital 
structure being more heavily weighted towards equity than towards debt (19,4% by 2035). The 
table below shows how the WACC changes over time 








Zola Electric SHS WACC was much higher than that of Kpone. This was driven behind the 
high cost of equity and equities high proportion of the total capital structure. He table below 




WACC schedule 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
kd 18,706% 19,200% 22,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000%
t 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Wd 46% 34% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ke 47,7% 38,5% 38,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0% 39,0%
We 54% 66% 87% 100% 100% 100% 100%
WACC = kd (1-t) * Wd + ke * We 34,255% 31,965% 35,850% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966% 38,966%
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CASH FLOW 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
EBITDA 102 673 717$          103 112 552$          105 103 378$          106 907 836$          256 117 454$          256 568 129$          256 400 305$          256 424 217$          256 390 727$          256 389 084$          
Tax 56 642 032$            56 600 076$            56 606 054$            56 597 682$            56 597 271$            
NOPAT 102 673 717             103 112 552             105 103 378             106 907 836             256 117 454             199 926 097             199 800 229             199 818 163             199 793 045             199 791 813             
Add: Depreciation 30 000 000                30 000 000                30 000 000                30 000 000                30 000 000                30 000 000                30 000 000                30 000 000                30 000 000                30 000 000                
Less: CAPEX 101 290 792             100 277 884             99 275 106                98 282 355                206 761 503             204 693 888             202 646 950             202 944 450             203 241 950             203 539 450             
Working Capital 16701024 16873323 52840446 69189127 35646903 35606760 35620500 35620500 -32523066 -63497414
Changes in WC 111 845                     -172 299                    -35 967 123              -16 348 681              33 542 224                40 143                        -13 740                      -                              68 143 566                30 974 348                
Free cash flows 131 402 638             130 105 585             93 307 982                111 933 674             270 303 727             234 734 031             232 633 209             232 944 450             301 385 516             264 513 798             
WACC: ( assuming WACC changes as the 
debt to equity ratio changes) 13% 14% 14% 16% 17% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19%
Discounted cashflows at WACC 19 166 314              15 076 756              8 226 223                 8 154 745                 15 209 753              9 975 046                 9 552 172                 9 564 952                 12 375 217              10 861 224              
NPV: ( assuming WACC changes as the debt 
to equity ratio changes) 481 314 298    
 
 
Calculation of the NPV  
To calculate the net present value of Kpone the below diagram shows the considerations 
implanted into excel based on the above described assumptions. Kpone’s final NPV came to be 
$481,314,298. 
 










To calculate the NPV of Zola Electric SHS the below diagram describes how this calculation 









CASH FLOW 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
EBITDA (73 663 948)$                    (106 211 084)$                  (100 418 534)$                  (132 652 129)$                  (166 798 743)$                  (63 447 034)$                    289 864 286$                   615 552 397$                   868 229 334$                   1 018 312 271$                
Tax
NOPAT -73 663 948                        -106 211 084                     -100 418 534                     -132 652 129                     -166 798 743                     -63 447 034                        289 864 286                       615 552 397                       868 229 334                       1 018 312 271                    
Changes in WC -                                        -104 237 404                     -59 375 416                        -124 884 266                     -155 089 466                     -105 415 797                     -61 812 052                        -47 316 732                        -18 475 748                        5 429 091                            
Free cash flows -73 663 948                        -210 448 488                     -159 793 950                     -257 536 395                     -321 888 209                     -168 862 831                     228 052 234                       568 235 665                       849 753 586                       1 023 741 362                    
Period 1                                            2                                            3                                            4                                            5                                            6                                            7                                            8                                            9                                            10                                         
WACC: ( assuming WACC changes as the 
debt to equity ratio changes) 34% 32% 36% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39%
Discounted cashflows at WACC (54 868 726)                      (120 844 155)                    (63 735 102)                      (69 055 877)                      (62 109 439)                      (23 446 451)                      22 785 989                        40 855 690                        43 965 051                        38 114 948                        
CASH FLOW 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038
EBITDA 1 069 052 152$    1 116 929 154$    1 162 109 234$    1 204 748 452$    1 216 937 384$    1 228 273 090$    1 238 815 298$    1 248 619 551$    1 257 737 506$    1 266 217 204$    
Tax 279 232 289          290 527 308          301 187 113          304 234 346          307 068 273          309 703 824          312 154 888          314 434 376          316 554 301          
NOPAT 1 069 052 152        837 696 866           871 581 925           903 561 339           912 703 038           921 204 818           929 111 473           936 464 663           943 303 129           949 662 903           
Changes in WC 4 537 855                4 392 433                4 248 580                4 106 615                -3 047 233              -2 833 927              -2 635 552              -2 451 063              -2 279 489              -82 679 925            
Free cash flows 1 073 590 007        842 089 299           875 830 505           907 667 954           909 655 805           918 370 891           926 475 922           934 013 600           941 023 641           866 982 978           
Period 11                              12                              13                              14                              15                              16                              17                              18                              19                              20                              
WACC: ( assuming WACC changes as the 
debt to equity ratio changes) 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39%
Discounted cashflows at WACC 28 762 991            16 234 699            12 150 571            9 061 375               6 534 836               4 747 514               3 446 456               2 500 244               1 812 676               1 201 768               
NPV: ( assuming WACC changes as the debt 




Calculation of the Equivalent Annual Annuity  
Ordinarily one would have to do a Equivalent Annual Annuity calculation to compare projects 
of unequal lives, however, given we have already established that Zola Electric’s SHS produces 
a negative NPV one can already tell that Kpone is the project the better return. Thus, it was 




In this section we explore the key findings of what criterion large institutional investors apply 
when assessing the viability of making an investment. The methodology applied in this study 
is premised on the theory put forward by Pindyck. This theory states that investors need to be 
assured of credibility and stability given the irreversible nature of investments. This means the 
risk of an investment needs to be thoroughly assessed beyond just the financials. The theory 
also states that investors delay investments until such a point they feel comfortable they making 
the right decision. This is partly the reason why investments often take a long time to be 
approved. The methodology went further to look at exactly what are the key assessment points 
made by investors when assessing risk for them to feel the investment they seek to pursue are 
credible and stable. The methodology applies a new framework that draws on the learnings of 
surveys conducted with institutional investors, published literature on the topic of achieving 
bankability in off-grid, information in the public domain released by the biggest private equity 
firms on what criteria they apply before making an investment and how past investments made 
in the sector achieved bankability. In this section we will explain the results and show how they 
link back to the findings of this theoretical perspective. We also outline the similarities found 
in previous literature and the assumptions made were applicable.  
 
In total the study looked at 12 published journals and reports, 7 previously conducted surveys, 
the top 19 private equity firms by funds under management and the top 9 investors into off-grid 
energy by investment size. The studies objective was to extrapolate the specifics in terms of 
what was required to reach project bankability. Where specifics were missing, we analysed 
press releases, speeches or company annual reports to further understand what criteria might 
have been applied to previous investments. Thus, in some cases one might find that, based on 
what has been said or written in the public domain, we interpret and infer what the criteria might 
be. Thus, in some cases assumptions have been made to reach certain conclusions’. Table 1 
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shows the overall concerns that were found in the literature. The results are broken down into 
each major section and explained.  
 
Table 19: Table showing the overall results of the key concerns found to be a major barrier 
to achieving project bankability  
 Overall Findings of what was a concern to Investors    
Key Concept  Number of points of analysis 
Amount of times key 
concept appears in all 
analysis % 
Policy and Regulatory certainty 47 12 26% 
Expected Rate of Return 47 15 32% 
Investment Ticket Size 47 26 55% 
Management Track Record 47 17 36% 
Risk Tolerance 47 15 32% 
Company Track Record 47 23 49% 
Investment Duration 47 13 28% 
Positive ESG'S impact 47 13 28% 
Geography 47 14 30% 
Investment types 47 2 4% 
Investment structure 47 6 13% 
Type of impact needed 47 2 4% 
 
 
Table 20: showing the overall importance of each criteria based on the amount of times it 
features in the literature 
 
Specifics of what is required from investors 
Key criteria Criteria Weight Based on number of times it appears 
Investment Ticket Size 17% 
Company Track Record 15% 
Management Track Record 11% 
Risk Tolerance 10% 
Geography 9% 
Expected Rate of Return 8% 
Positive ESG'S impact 8% 
Investment Duration 8% 
Policy and Regulatory certainty 8% 
 
Investment Ticket Size 
The investment ticket size was found to be the most important criteria investors looked for 
when assessing the bankability of an Off-grid solar company. Investment ticket size relates to 
the total financial value of an investment. The investment ticket size becomes important for 3 
main reasons. The first one is transaction costs. Transaction costs are all the costs associated 
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with making an investment. These costs include the costs of lawyers and personal conducting 
the due diligence. These costs are often fixed in nature thus if an investments size is too small 
to warrant the amount of effort put into making the deal a reality, investors may choose to not 
even entertain an application for investment. The second is the risk associated with the lack of 
scale. Given the inherent risk of having to finance these off-grid units to households that earn 
very low incomes, there is significant risk of default. However, studies such as Malhotra’s et 
al, 2017 have shown that when these projects reach scale this risk reduces. The final key 
consideration was the absolute value of the return on offer. A high percentage may look 
attractive however the absolute return of that investment needs to be able to make a significant 
difference to the portfolio of investments return. If this is too low, then an investment could 
well be overlooked.  
 
Our analysis shows that there are roughly 3 bands that may qualify an investment as financially 
viable. These are the $10M-$50M, $50M-$100M and $100M and above ranges. Our analysis 
shows that to meet the investment ticket size criteria over 50% of the sources assessed stated 
this was in the $10M-$50M range. 15% in the $50M -$100M and only 8% in the above $100M 
range. It worth mentioning that 27% of the sources assessed pointed out that projects need to 
be aggregated and scaled to meet investment ticket size criteria. Our study reaches the 
conclusion that any project in need of finance needs to at least be looking for between $10M -
$50M and show strong plans on how to achieve scale.  
 
 
Table 21: showing the key criteria investors look for in the assessment of an investment 
 
Company Track Record 
 
Company track record was featured as the second most important metric when assessing the 
viability of an investment. The table details at what stage institutional investors were willing to 
invest in off-grid companies. The stage an institutional investor is willing to invest in can also 
be a sign of what risk they are willing to take on in an investment. This is because the earlier a 
Specifics of what is required from investors 
Key Concept  Key Criteria 1 Key Criteria 2 Key Criteria 3 Key Criteria 4 
Investment Ticket Size $10k-$50M $50M-$100M $100M and above 
Aggregate Projects to Reduce 
Risk Premiums 
Number of observations 13.00 4.00 2 7 
% of total observations based 
on number of firms that 
confirmed this as a concern 50% 15% 8% 27% 
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business is in its investment life cycle the higher the associated risk and thus the higher the 
expected return.  
 
Our findings show that of the literature reviewed and of the top PE firms analysed, over 40% 
preferred mature companies with stable cash flows with the ability to still grow. The maturity 
of the companies required shows a high degree of risk averseness by institutional investors. 
35% of the literature reviewed and companies analysed showed a strong preference for 
expansion stage companies or late venture capital. Companies at this stage have a proven 
business model and sometimes operate in industries where there is no clear market leader yet. 
Companies at this stage of the investment cycle are riskier investments than mature companies 
but still hold a good level of predictability in their cash flow capabilities. While over 70% of 
our analytical points showed this was the stage institutional investors were willing to invest 
almost no PE or asset manager was willing to fund start-ups unless this came from their venture 
capital business silo that tends to have far less assets under management. All companies willing 
to invest in the start-up phase of off-grid were either development finance institutions or impact 
investors. This was mainly because of how well-off-grid companies can address ESG factors 
and developmental impact issues. High risk levels for these types of institutions are also more 
acceptable. The finding here is that off-grid companies need proven business models and show 
that they can generate profits and stable cash flows to become investment attractive  
 
Table 22: Showing what stage of a company life cycle institutional investors are willing to 
invest 
Company Track Record Fund Start-Ups 
Established expansion stage 
companies with potential for 
global market share leadership 
Mature high growth companies with 
positive EBITDA and stable cash flows 
Number of observations 5 8 10 
% of total observations based on number 
of firms that confirmed this as a concern 22% 35% 43% 
 
Management Track Record 
Management’s track record featured as the third most important criteria. This criterion focuses 
on the managing team’s expertise and how well they have delivered on those expertise in the 
past.  All sources showed that investors needed a management team with both the expertise to 
manage the company and should have shown a track record for delivering great results. The 
main reason why this is such a significant phenomenon is investors require certainty. Part of 
the certainty they require is the fact that the company that they are investing in have the right 
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skills in place to deliver on their mandate. Our study found that of the 17 sources we analysed 
all found the above criteria to be pertinent in their investment decisions. 
 
Table 23 showing sources that confirmed management track record as a key criterion to 
project viability 
Management Track Record 
Management with a proven Company 
Track Record to deliver in their 
industry 
Number of observations 17 
% of total observations based on number 




The Risk Tolerance metric tried to understand what risk factors featured as the most prominent 
for institutional investors. The literature highlights that there is a lot of concern around the 
consumer financing aspect for off-grid solar companies. Given that the most successful 
business models to date have been around offering consumer financing, a lot of institutional 
investors worry about the risk associated with carrying so much consumer debt. Based on the 
literature reviewed 33% were found to highlight this as a risk. Unsurprisingly, this is the same 
risk faced by base load power stations. Investors often cite off taker risk as a key concern to 
investing in Power stations in Africa. 
 
 The second highest identified criteria came from that of private equity (PE) firms. They often 
have strict criteria that governs the type of companies they invest in. what was found was of 
those PE firms that made this information public all stated that they prefer to invest in 
investment grade companies. If one also looks at the top PE firms, they either preferred 
expansion stage/late stage firms and mature high growth companies with stable cash flows. 
Based on these two findings we interpret “investment grade” to mean companies that are in 
either of these three stages of their business life cycle.  
 
The literature points towards the need for off-grid companies’ products to be project financed.  
Project finance structures help limit risk by allocating risk to the parties best positioned to deal 
with that particular risk. Thus, risk such as consumer debt can be sold off to third parties by 
way of factoring arrangements. The last consideration was that of ESG risks. Of the respondents 
that highlighted ESG’s as a key risk factor all were impact funds. These funds tended to have 
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clear ESG criteria that had to be met. Thus, projects require grants or impact investor funding 
would need to meet key ESG criterion. 
 
The below table summarises what an institutional investor needs before they ready to make an 
investment.  
 
Table 24 showing most prominent risk factors identified 
 
Risk Considerations ESG Risk 
Consumer Default 
Risk 
Use Project Finance to 
limit risk 
Only investment Grade 
Companies 
Number of observations 3 5 3 4 
% of total observations based 
on amount of firms that 
confirmed this as a concern 20% 33% 20% 27% 
 
Geography  
The geography metric looked at whether where Asset managers and PE firms could invest was 
an obstacle to achieving project bankability. This metric tries to understand whether there is a 
preferred geographical location in investing.  Given we looked at the biggest asset managers 
and PE firms globally, some funds analysed had a geographical preference to where they ended 
up investing. There are various reasons why funds have specific geographies. The funds we 
assessed differed based on the type of investor they were. PE firms preferred companies that 
operated in geographies they had local expertise already present and were they understood the 
local investment climate. Whereas some asset managers ruled out geographies that had high 
political risk. However, of the funds assessed only 21% had a geographical preference that 
excluded Africa. Our study finds that Geography is not a true obstacle to achieving project 
bankability. The below table shows these findings  
 






Geography Africa included Excludes Africa
Number of observations 11 3
% of total observations based on amount of 





There is a lot of literature on what the expected return is by institutional investors on African 
investments. This study attempted to shy away from simply restating what that return is and 
focused more on understanding what the potential diagnostics were for trying to achieve this 
aspect of project viability. However, given the nature of the study was also to assess what the 
requirements are for institutional investors, we have included their requirements in our analysis. 
It is worth noting that all returns were based on dollar returns 
 
Our findings show that of all the institutional investors assessed only one stated that they were 
happy with “a market related return” which generally falls between 7%-10% in private equity.  
All other asset managers and private equity firms had market related return expectations based 
on the geography they were investing in. Thus, based on PWC.2017 the entry level return 
expected for an African infrastructure project was 21%.  However, our study on financing 
shows that this return is adjusted for company track record or stage of investment (up to 2.5% 
risk premium) and for the significant growth expectations required for companies in these early 
investment stage (up to 2.5% risk premium). Thus, our interpretation is that a market related 
return wouldn’t be less than 26%. This amount could be higher depending on the context of 
where the off-grid company seeks to operate in.  
 
One of the most widely stated challenges for off-grid companies to reach project bankability is 
the unrealistic return expectations of institutional investors and most notably venture capital 
firms. The multiples in return required by them in the short duration (5-7 years) makes it 
extremely difficult for them to be attractive (Bertha Centre 2016). This finding is consistent 
with our own findings in an earlier portion of our paper. Our paper found that the expected 
return for a Zola Electric investment into off-grid in Ghana averaged 40% year on year.  Thus, 
the true value add from our findings was establishing the consensus on what needs to take place 
in order for projects to reach bankability. Our findings show that aggregating off-grid 
companies or projects to achieve scale has a material effect on reducing the required risk 
premium. This is consistent with a study released by Baker Mackenzie 2019 that found that the 
consolidating off-grid companies based on what jurisdiction they operate in would make further 
investment into this sector attractive. This was mainly because aggregation reduces the risk 
premium required. 40% of the papers reviewed stated this as a key metric to achieving 
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bankability. The second diagnostic was to implement innovative policy to encourage 
investment into the sector. 2 studies mention these to be tax subsidies to help reduce risk.  
 
Overall our findings show that expected returns on African projects are still set to stay above 
21% per annum. Thus, focus should be placed on finding innovative ways to reduce risk 
premiums of projects to help more off-grid SHS companies achieve project viability. The 
consensus on how this should be done is by way of aggregation and potentially innovative 
policy such as tax subsidies. The below table shows our findings in detail.  
 
 
Table 26 showing required rate of return expectations 
 
Rates of Return 7%-10% 
Rates of return 
equal to or above 
what is expected for 
Africa. Over 21% as 
published by PWC  
Expected Returns are too 
high. Aggregate Projects 
to Reduce Risk Premiums 
Innovative Policy to reduce 
Risk Via Tax Subsidies  
Number of observations 1.00 6 6.00 2 
% of total observations 
based on amount of firms 
that confirmed this as a 





A lot of the top asset managers and private equity firm subscribe to the United Nations 
Principles for responsible investment. This document covers a broad set of Environmental, 
Social and Governmental (ESG) criteria that subscribers should meet when assessing their 
investments. In recent years this definition has been expanded to include other areas such as 
fossil fuel investing and investments that have a positive impact on overall society. There has 
been a growing trend towards large institutional investors make sure this is a key consideration 
in their investment consideration (Bertha Centre for social innovation and entrepreneurship, 
2016).  
 
Considering the nature of the off-grid companies being assessed for this study we find that there 
should be no challenge in meeting this criterion. An analysis as to why is broken down by each 




Environmentally, the Solar Home Systems (SHS) all rely on solar power to charge the batteries 
that store energy. Some advanced systems such as Zola Electrics Infinity system can operate 
on a hybrid model where they make efficient use of grid power that relies on “dirty” energy, by 
storing power and disbursing it when needed. Thus, from an environmental perspective the SHS 
assessed by this study were found to meet the positive environmental impact criteria.  
 
Socially, the SHS are intended for a class of consumer that does not have access to electricity. 
given Africa’s challenges in building Power stations early estimates show that access to energy 
could only be a reality for most household by 2040 (Castellano, A.et al 2015).Thus growing 
distribution rapidly of these SHS allows the continent to accelerate its electrification ambitions 
and bring the population closer to its development goals. Another aspect of the SHS assessed 
is that of achieving consumer affordability. There is a big drive towards offering consumer 
finance by way of mobile money. Mobile money allows the unbanked to easily transfer money 
via basic phones and pay for thing such as utility bills, loans etc. By leveraging this platform 
SHS companies have been able to offer consumer financing in order to encourage uptake of the 
units.  
 
Thus based on the SHS companies assessed in this study, one can see that SHS have the 
capability of meeting United Nations Sustainable Development goals 7 (access to affordable 
clean energy) and to a certain extent 13 (climate action) through how they produce power 
through clean energy. It is based on this set of facts we conclude that a significant amount of 




The Bertha Centre for social innovation and entrepreneurship, 2016 found that the financing 
duration needed by companies providing SHS were over 9 years. This time period would allow 
these companies to build scale, establish their brand and have a proven track record for 
collecting consumer debt. However, our study and previous studies show that the financing 
duration on offer by institutional investors, impact funds, DFI’s and banks are not long enough 
to allow for the firm to establish themselves. Our study reaches similar conclusions. Of the 
institutional investors assessed 46% had stated that they typically only finance firms for 5-7 
years. The other 46% showed that they were willing to invest for periods longer than 7 years 
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provided other bankability criteria were met. However, of this number reduces to just 31% if 
you consider the fact that of those assessed some institutional investors excluded developing 
markets in their criteria. If we had to consider the fact that commercial lenders and 
Development finance institutions only finance for periods of 5 and 4 years respectively, this 
makes it harder for off-grid companies to achieve bankability (The International Finance 
Corporation, 2018).  
 
The required Investment duration of investors can only be broken if governments or 
development finance institutions start implementing innovative policy solutions or start 
extending their loan terms. This might help crowd in investment Baker Mackenzie 2019. Thus 
our overall findings shows that the misaligned investment horizon poses challenges to further 
investment into the sector.  
 
Table 27 showing investment duration investors expect to remain invested 
 
 
Investment Duration Under 5 Years 5-7 Years Over 7 Years 
Number of observations 1 6 6 
% of total observations based on amount 
of firms that confirmed this as a concern 8% 46% 46% 
 
 
Policy and regulatory certainty 
The key barrier to achieving project bankability were whether there are plans to extend the grid, 
whether there will be any Tariff interventions that might negatively impact the return on 
investment and a vague policy environment. Grid extension is important in the sense that, grid 
power is always known to be cheaper per kWh due to the inherent below cost tariffs offered by 
many African state utilities (PWC. 2018). The subsidies distort the market pricing and render 
off-grid applications uncompetitive. However, more established energy sources such as coal, 
gas and nuclear have achieved the scale needed to reduce the costs per kWh needed to be 
charged whereas solar can still be a young technology that is on route to achieving a reduced 
cost. Thus an extension of the grid almost leads to a slower up take in off-grid applications. 
Vague policy and regulatory environments make it difficult for businesses to plan. A vague 
policy environment also adds to the risk premium investors apply when assessing the viability 
of an investment. These uncertainties result in additional costs such as political risk insurance. 
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Overall a vague policy environment may result in investors delaying their investment until such 
a time policy has been sufficiently clarified to bring certainty (PWC 2017). The above findings 
are consistent with those of Pindyck in the sense that investors choose to delay their investment 
if there remains a sense of uncertainty in the investment environment Pindyck, 1990. 
 
The final key finding in the literature was the effect cost reflective tariffs have on an investment. 
Governments often regulate tariffs based on certain criteria. An example of these could be a 
tariff that is set based on the covering a fixed cost, debt servicing costs, variable costs and a 
desired return on investment for equity holders. However, if tariffs are not negotiated and 
aligned at the outset before an investment is made changes to the tariff can have a significant 
effect on the viability of a project PWC. (2015). While cost reflective tariffs apply to traditional 
base load power stations that have very high fixed costs its not to say these concerns don’t exist 
for current investors into off-grid energy given one seeks to provide the same service.  
 
Overall the results show that off-grid Policy and Regulatory concerns ranked last out of the 9 
issues identified as an investment barrier to making off-grid bankable. This possibly could be 
attributed to the fact that standalone off-grid applications are seen to be a consumer product as 
opposed to a utility that often has an a lot more stringent regulatory environment. The key 
concerns identified within Policy and regulatory concerns were vague policy and regulatory 
environments, Grid extension and cost reflective tariffs respectively. 
 
Table 28 showing the key criteria investors look for in the assessment of an investment 
Specifics of what is required from investors 
Key Concept  Key Criteria 1 Key Criteria 2 Key Criteria 3 Key Criteria 4 
Policy and Regulatory 
concerns 
Vague policy and 
regulatory environment 
Clear plans on Grid extension 
and support for Off-grid Cost reflective Tariff   
  5.00 4.00 3.00   
  42% 33% 25%   
 
 
Overall on how to achieve project bankability  
Based on the key findings above the study has formulated a framework on how best to assess 
project viability specific to off-grid companies. This framework is explained by the table below. 
The framework draws on the findings of the study. The key criteria is ranked based on how 
many of the assessed studies and top institutional investors highlighted specific barriers to 




Criteria Weight Based 
on number of times it 
appears Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3 Criteria 4
Investment Ticket Size 16% $10k-$50M $50M-$100M $100M and above
Aggregate Projects to Reduce Risk 
Premiums
50% 65% 73% 100%
Company Track Record
15% Fund Start-Ups
Established expansion stage 
companies with potential 
for global market share 
leadership
Mature high growth 
companies  with positive 
EBITDA and stable cash 
flows
22% 57% 100%
Management Track Record 11%
Management with a proven 
Company Track Record to 
deliver in their industry
100%
Risk Tolerance 9% ESG Risk Consumer Default Risk
Use Project Finance to 
limit risk Only investment Grade Companies
20% 53% 73% 100%
Geography 9% Africa included Excludes Africa
79% 100%
Expected Rate of Return
9% 7%-10%
Rates of return equal to or 
above whats expected for 
Africa. Over 21% as 
published by PWC 
Expected Returns are too 
high. Aggregate Projects 
to Reduce Risk Premiums
Innovative Policy to reduce Risk Via 
Tax Subsidies 
7% 47% 87% 100%
Postive ESG'S impact 8%
Strong Emphasis on the 
investment being ESG 
compliant
100%
Investment Duration 8% Under 5 Years 5-7 Years Over 7 Years
100% 46% 31%
Policy and Regulatory certainty 8%
Vague policy and 
regulatory enviroment
Clear plans on Grid 
extension and support for 
Off Grid Cost reflective Tariff
42% 75% 100%
Specifics of what is required from investors
assessed on off-grid. This weight is represented by the second column in the table. As can be 
seen from the table below the top 3 barriers to off-grid companies achieving bankability are 
investment ticket size, company track record and management track record. Reading from left 
to right, if we consider a single company trying to achieve bankability, they would assess the 
criteria based on how far their company was able to tick boxes going to the far right. For 
example, if a off-grid company seeking funding were to apply they could assess the viability of 
their proposal by looking at how much they require. Thus under investment ticket size if they 
were applying for $50M they would have achieved 65% of the 16% weighting.  
 
 























Conclusions and recommendations  
 
The study has structured the conclusions and recommendations sections in two parts. The first 
part provides the conclusions reached into what the key insights were on the study on the 
return analysis. The second part provides insight on what the key findings were on project 
bankability. Overall, each section is structured in a way that provides a summary of the key 
findings and the recommendations proposed by this study. Both sections are summarised in 




The aim of the study was to assess which energy technology offered the most superior return 
to potential investors. The study also had the aim of establishing a framework in which future 
studies could use to compare returns of differing energy technologies. In order to achieve this 
aim the study focused on using the recently built Combined Cycle Gas Turbine power station 
named Kpone in Ghana. In order to make fair comparison this technology was compared to 
Zola Electric’s recently launched Zola infinity unit in Ghana. The objective of the study was 
to use the Net Present Value model to assess investment returns of a natural gas power station 
and a off-grid unit. The net outcome we seek to understand is which generation technology 
offered the higher return. Based on the assumptions stated in the discussion of findings 
section this paper has made a few contributions to the current body of literature. These are 
numbered below and explained in depth. 
 
1) The Combined Cycle Gas Turbine Power station in Ghana (Kpone) offers a better 
risk-adjusted return than an investment into Zola Electric’s infinity unit in the context 
of Ghana.  
2) The combined effects of the debt to equity structure and the high expected returns for 
an early stage company make the cost of capital too high for off-grid companies to 
compete with investments into the grid 
With regards to the first point, our study found that if an investor were to invest in Zola 
Electric unit with the aim of achieving the same electrification rates as Kpone, they would 
achieve a negative NPV of  $161M. The key drivers of this negative return is the high 
discount rates employed on Zola electric. The average WACC was 38% over the same 20 
year period. In comparison, Kpone average WACC was 18%.  The key differing reasons 
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behind such a high discount rate were the debt to equity structure and the high risk in 
investing in early stage companies with relatively untested technologies.  
 
With regards to the capital structure, a well-known fact is debt is relatively cheaper than 
equity. Given Kpone relied on a project financing structure that is characterized by very high 
debt financing and allocation of risk to parties best suited to deal with that risk, Kpone cost of 
debt was never higher than 9.375%. This debt had a weight of 72% in the total capital raised. 
The equity portion cost averaged 15% with a weighting of only 28% of the total funds raised.  
In comparison, Zola electric debt costs were 20% with debt making up only 55% of the total 
structure. Equity cost 39% on average with a very high weighting of 45% in the total capital 
structure. Thus the effects of discounting and the higher portion of equity in the capital 
structure would have negatively affected the outcomes of the study.   
 
Thus if one looked at the outcome of this study one concludes that, so long as off-grid 
companies are still deemed risky investments due to the early nature of their technology, 
investments in the grid will offer a better risk-adjusted return.  
 
The recommendations put forward by our study is that there needs to be policies that actively 
attempt to de-risk off-grid investments such as tax subsidies, interest subsidies or factoring 
trade receivables to provide cash certainty. Further papers should explore whether the same 
findings are true in other jurisdictions such as East Africa where mobile money has allowed 
companies to assess the strength of consumers to pay based on history. This fact would go 
some way in de-risking the investment. There’s also scope to study further what the effect tax, 
interest and general subsidies have on de-risking an investment to provide optimal returns.  
 
Bankability  
The aim of the bankability study was to assess the criteria off-grid companies need to meet 
before investors invest in their ventures. Secondary to this aim was to establish a framework 
that could be used by off-grid companies to assess whether their projects are likely to meet 
project viability criteria. The objective of the study thus became to conduct desk research on 
what criteria the largest institutional investors by assets under management employ when 
assessing a company’s viability. Secondary to this was to create a framework that helped 
guide companies on how they can achieve project viability. Based on the discussion of 




- The study has provided a ranking on what the most important bankability criteria for 
start-up’s or off-grid companies  
- The study has created a new framework on how best to assess this criterion  
With regards to the first finding, the finding was established by looking at past interviews 
conducted with investors, published reports and literature and lastly by conducting research 
on information in the public domain on what criteria the largest fund managers apply when 
seeking to invest.  The top three criteria that had to be met by off-grid companies were the 
investment ticket, company track record and management’s track record. What was evident in 
the study was that, fund managers view off-grid energy companies as ‘start-up” companies. 
This meant that a lot of the off-grid companies had not reached the level of maturity yet 
mainly due to the investment ticket sizes be too small and company track records being 
unestablished. Based on this, it was for this reason why the majority of investors were DFI’s 
or impact investors were the above criteria is not always as important. Other issues that are 
evident were the fact that the required rate of returns for off-grid companies are too high 
resulting in many of institutional investors rejecting them. This is confirmed by our own study 
that shows that, due to the high associated risks with investing in relatively early stage 
companies, investors’ required returns lead to the capital employed returning a negative NPV.  
 
With regards to the second finding in this study, the framework should be used to assess to 
the strength of a company in off-grids ability to raise funding. This criteria, although not set 
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